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In this paper we critically review the literature on the political econ-
omy of monetary policy, with an eye on the questions raised by the recent
￿nancial crisis. We begin with a discussion of rules versus discretion. We
then examine the issue of Central Banks independence both in normal
times, in times of crisis. Then we review the literature of electoral manip-
ulation of policies. Finally we address international institutional issues
concerning the feasibility, optimality and political sustainability of cur-
rency unions in which more than one country share the same currency. A
brief review of the Euro experience concludes the paper.
1 Introduction
Had we written this paper before the summer of 2008 we would have concluded
that there was much agreement amongst economists about the optimal institu-
tional arrangements for monetary policy. For the specialists there were many
open questions, but for most outsiders (including non monetary economists)
many issues seemed to be settled.1An hypothetical paper written (at least by
us, but we believe by many others) before the summer of 2008 would have
concluded that:
1) Monetary policy is better left to independent Central Banks at harms
length from the politicians and the treasury.
2) Most Central Banks should (and must do) follow some type of in￿ ation
targeting; that is they look at in￿ ation as an indicator of when to loosen up
or tighten up. Certain Central Banks do it more explicitly than others, but
in￿ ation targeting has basically "won".
￿Prepared for the Handbook of Monetary Economics. We thank Olivier Blanchard,
Francesco Giavazzi, Loukas Karabarbounis, Lars Svensson, Guido Tabellini, Jan Zilinski, Luigi
Zingales and many participants at the ECB conference in Frankfurt in October 2009 for useful
comments. Our greatest debt is towards Benjamin Friedman who followed from the begin-
ning this project and our discussant at the conference Allan Drazen who gave us very useful
comments. Dorian Carloni and Giampaolo Lecce provided excellent research assistantship.
1See Goodfriend (2007) for a discussion of how such consensus was reached.
13) Independent Central Banks anchored to an in￿ ation target have lead to
the great moderation and a solution to the problem of in￿ ation with moderate
output ￿ uctuations.
4) Politicians sometimes use Central Banks as scapegoats (especially in Eu-
rope) but in practice in recent years politicians in OECD countries have had
little room to in￿ uence the course of monetary policy, for instance to stimulate
the economy before elections. Blaming the ECB in Europe was very common
in the early part of this decade as a justi￿cation of the low growth in several
countries of the Euro area, due to the supposedly too high interest rates.
5) The experience of the Euro was overall relatively positive, but the Euro-
pean currency had not been tested yet in a period of a major recession.
The most serious ￿nancial crisis of the post war era, has reopened the
debate about monetary policy and institutions. One view is that what went
wrong was the fact that monetary policy in the early part of the ￿rst decade
of the new century went o⁄ the right track and abandoned sound principles
of in￿ ation targeting, perhaps in response to political pressures to avoid at all
cost a recession in the early part of the 2000s and a misplaced excessive fear
of de￿ ation. 2 Others argue instead that in￿ ation targeting has failed because
it did not take into proper account the risk of bubbles in real estate and in
￿nancial markets. This point of view implies that rules have to be more ￿ exible
to allow monetary policy to react to a wider variety of variables in addition
to the price dynamics of goods and services. Others have argued instead that
in￿ ation targeting is ￿ne but the level of target in￿ ation was too low and should
be raised to avoid risk of de￿ ation and monetary traps. 3 In addition the current
crisis has given us a fresh opportunity to observe the behavior of the economies
in Euroland which share a common currency in a period of economic stress with
mixed results.
Therefore the way this chapter is organized is as follows. For each topic we
critically review the pre crisis literature and then we discuss what new issues the
￿nancial crisis has reopened and how it has changed our perceptions. The topic
which we address in turn are: rules versus discretion (in section 2); Central Bank
independence (section 3); political in￿ uence on monetary policy and political
business cycles (section 4); the politics and economics of monetary unions in
general (section 5) and with speci￿c reference to the Euro (section 6). The last
section concludes.
2 Rules versus Discretion
An enormous literature has dealt with this question, and it is unnecessary to
provide yet another detailed survey of it.4 There are two ways of thinking about
rules versus discretion, one in a speci￿c sense and another one in a broader way.
The narrow interpretation is the "in￿ ation bias" pointed out by Kydland and
2See Taylor (2009) for a forceful argument along these lines.
3Blanchard, Dell Ariccia and Mauro (2010)
4See for instance Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
2Prescott (1977) ￿rst and then developed by Barro and Gordon (1983a,b). The
more general discussion of rules versus discretion, however, goes well beyond this
particular example, and encompasses other policy objectives that the Central
Bank may have. This more general approach is the way in which we would
like to think about the issue of rules versus discretion in the present paper.
Namely we want to focus upon whether the actions of the Central Bank should
be irrevocably ￿xed in advance by rules, laws, and unchangeable plans or
whether the Central Bank should be free to act with discretion ex post with
ample margin of maneuver. We will proceed as follows. For concreteness we
review the issue of rules versus discretion using the Barro and Gordon (1983a)
model and then we discuss how these issues generalize to other areas of policy.
2.1 The basic problem
Politicians may have an incentive to in￿ ate the economy because they believe
that the unemployment rate is too high (or the GDP gap too high or the GDP
growth too low). This may be because the economy is distorted by taxes or by
labor unions which keep real wages above the market clearing full employment
level since they care more about employed union members than unemployed non
members. By rational expectations only unexpected in￿ ation can temporarily
increase real economic activity. The public understands the incentive of the
policy makers to increase in￿ ation, rationally expects it and in equilibrium there
is in￿ ation above target and output and unemployment at their "distorted"
rates. This was o⁄ered as an explanation for periods of "stag￿ ation", i.e. trend
increases in unemployment and in￿ ation.
A policy rule which commits the policy maker to a certain pre announced
in￿ ation path would solve the problem. But, how can one make the rule stick
and be credible? Precisely because of the "temptation" to deviate from the rule,
one needs a mechanism of enforcement. One is simply the cost of giving up the
accumulated stock of credibility of the central bank and the loss of reputation
which would entail a deviation form the rule. Another one is some institutional
arrangement which makes it explicitly costly (or impossible) for the monetary
authority to deviate from it. We examine them both.
2.2 Reputation
Models of reputation building in monetary policy derive from applications of
repeated game theory, adapted to the game between a Central Banker and
market expectations.5 A very simple (and well known) model serves the purpose
of illustrating the trade-o⁄ between the rigidities of rules and the bene￿ts of
discretion. Suppose that output (yt) is given by :
5Some authors have questioned the applicability of repeated game theory to a situation in
which a "player" is market expectations. See Drazen (2000) and the references cited therein
for discussion of this technical issue.
3yt = ￿t ￿ ￿e
t (1)
where ￿t is in￿ ation, ￿e
t is expected in￿ ation. The market level of output
is normalized at zero. The social planner , or Central Banker (the two are








where k > 0 is the target level of output and b is the weight attributed
to the cost of deviation of output from its target relative to the deviation of
in￿ ation from its target, namely zero. The fact that the target on output k is
greater than the market generated level of zero is the source of the time inconsis-
tency problem. The policymaker controls in￿ ation directly.6 The discretionary
equilibrium is obtained by minimizing (2) holding ￿e
t constant and then impos-
ing rational expectations. The solution is, where the subscript D stands for
discretion7:
￿D = bk (3)
yD
t = 0 (4)
In￿ ation is higher the larger is the weight given to output in the loss function
and the di⁄erence between the target rate of output k and the market generated
one, namely zero. The optimal rule is, instead:
￿￿
t = 0
6There is no loss of generality in this assumption for the purpose of the use made of this
simple,model. Closing the model with some demand side which links money to nominal income















t = E(￿t) and solve by simple algebra remembering that E("t) = 0 for the public.
4y￿
t = 0 (5)
where the superscript ￿ stands for rule. The rule provides a net gain: lower
in￿ ation and the same level of output. But if the public expects the optimal rule
of zero in￿ ation the Central Bank has the "temptation" to generate an unex-
pected in￿ ationary shock and a short run increase in output. The cost is given
by the fact that for a certain number of periods the public will not believe that
the Central Bank will follow the rule and the economy will revert to the sub op-
timal discretionary equilibrium. This is labeled the "enforcement" namely the
di⁄erence in utility between a certain numbers of periods of discretion instead
of the rule. The optimal policy of zero in￿ ation is sustainable when these costs
of enforcement are higher than the temptation.
Even when the optimal rule is not sustainable, in general a range of in￿ ation
rates with an upper bound of ￿D = bk is sustainable. The lowest level of this
range which is the best sustainable outcome, is the equilibrium8 The largest is
the enforcement relative to the temptation the lower is the lowest in￿ ation rate
in the sustainable range. Formally the sustainable in￿ ation rule is:
￿t = ￿o (6)
If the public expects the central bank to follow the rule, then the central








The temptation to deviate from the rule is given by the di⁄erence between
the utility loss given by not cheating and the utility loss given by cheating and
it is equal to:
1
2(1 + b)
(bk ￿ ￿o)2 (8)
Let￿ s assume, as Barro and Gordon (1983a), that the economy expects the
central bank to follow the rule only if it did so last period and otherwise expects
the level of in￿ ation under discretion. The enforcement is then:
￿
2
(b2k2 ￿ (￿o)2) (9)
8There are of course subtle issues of multiplicity since a range not one level of in￿ation is
in general sustainable. We do not enter into this technical discussion here.
5An in￿ ation rule is enforceable only if the cost of cheating is higher than the
bene￿t which is true if:
1 ￿ ￿(1 + b)
￿(1 + b) + 1
bk ￿ ￿o ￿ bk (10)
The best enforceable rule is then:
max(0; ￿o =
1 ￿ ￿(1 + b)
￿(1 + b) + 1
bk) (11)
and it implies an equilibrium in￿ ation which may be higher than the ￿rst
best zero in￿ ation, but lower than the in￿ ation under discretion. 9 Note that
with no discounting ￿ = 1 the optimal rate of zero in￿ ation is in the sustainable
range while with high discounting it would not; also with full discounting of
the future ￿ = 0 there is no enforcement and only the discretionary policy is
sustainable.
The basic conclusion of this literature is that if a Central bank has a cred-
ibility capital (i.e. it has followed the optimal rule for a long time), it has a
low discount factor it would highly value the loss in terms to a return to the
sub optimal discretionary equilibrium and therefore the optimal rule would be
more easily sustainable. However, as we discuss more below, low discount fac-
tors may be the norm rather than the exception, when political incentives (like
upcoming elections) are explicitly taken into consideration.10
Note that the application of the punishment by the public (i.e. the reaction
to a deviation from the rule on the part of the Central Bank) relies on the
fact that monetary policy is observable, namely the public can detect when the
central Bank is abandoning a rule or instead is responding to some unexpected
shock (like a shift in money demand).Canzoneri (1985) points out that in this
case reputation based models imply di¢ culties in implementing the optimal rule
in equilibrium. Drazen and Masson (1994) argue that the implementation of
contractionary monetary policies may decrease instead of increase the credibility
of central banks; since policies have persistent e⁄ects, an anti-in￿ ationary policy
today may have dire e⁄ects on unemployment in the future, making the future
9Drazen (2000) in Chapter 4 provides a discussion and interpretation of the issue of time
inconsistency. He views it, correctly, as emerging from the lack of a policy instrument which
makes it optimal even for rational agents to be "fooled". In the example presented above with
a full kit of policy instruments one could eliminate the distortion which keeps output level
below the full employment one.
10We have assumed that the punishment period last only one period. If it lasted longer lower
in￿ation rates would be more easily enforceable. In this game the length of the punishment
period is arbitrary adding another dimension to the problem of multiplicity of equilibria.
6commitment to anti-in￿ ationary policies less credible.11 A large literature has
investigated various cases of this game, for instance when the public is unsure
about the objective function of the policymaker (Backus and Dri¢ l (1985a,b)
and Barro (1986)). 12 The model with uncertainty regarding the policy prefer-
ences of the Central Bank seemed to explain why the disin￿ ation of the early
eighties in the US led to a recession. The idea was that in￿ ationary expecta-
tions took a while to learn the new Volcker￿ s policy rule and whether or not he
was really "though" against in￿ ation. In other words this model explained why
even with rational expectations a disin￿ ation can have negative real e⁄ects on
growth.
2.3 Simple rules and contingent rules
Deviations from simple rules are easy to detect. If a rule says "in￿ ation has to
be 2 percent exactly every quarter" it is easy to spot deviations from it, but
it is likely to be too rigid. In fact, realistic in￿ ation targeting rules allow for
deviations from the target for several quarters, in the course of the business
cycle. A very simple example illustrates the trade-o⁄ between the rigidity of
rules and the ￿ exibility of discretion. Suppose that output (yt) is given by :
yt = ￿t ￿ ￿e
t + "t (12)
where we now added "t which is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance
￿2
". The social planner minimizes the same loss function as above. The shock to
output "t captures in the simplest possible way all the random events that mon-
etary policy could possibly stabilize. We abstract from persistence of shocks,
multiplicity as well as many other complications. The discretionary equilibrium
is solved minimizing (2) holding ￿e
t constant and then imposing rational ex-
pectations, which are formed before the shock "t occurs, but the policymaker
chooses in￿ ation after the realization of it. This assumption is what allows a
stabilization role for monetary policy.13
The solution is14:
11They present some evidence of this mechanism drawing from the experience of the EMS; in
times of high unemployment the absence of a realignment was seen as lowering the credibility
of ￿xed parities instead of enhancing it.
12For an extended treatment of reputational model of monetary policy see Cukierman
(1992), Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini ( 2000) and the references cited therein.
Given the existence of these excellent surveys we do not pursue the technical aspect of repu-
tation models here.
13On simple and standard justi￿cation of this assumption is the existence of wage contracts














The discretionary solution includes a positive in￿ ation rate (bk) and a sta-
bilization term ( b
1+b"t ). Thus:
E(￿D) = bk E(yD
t ) = 0 V ar(yD





Note that the average in￿ ation is higher than its target (zero) The average
output is the market generated level (zero) and therefore below the target k,
but its variance is lower than it would be without any monetary stabilization
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This rule keeps in￿ ation on average at its target (zero) and allows for the
same output stabilization as discretion. However, this rule is not time consistent
because if the market participants expects the rule, the policymaker has an
incentive to choose the discretionary policy ￿D
t ; generating an unexpected burst
of unexpected in￿ ation, bk, increasing output. But again, as discussed above,
reputational mechanism might sustain the optimal rule.
2.4 All problem solved....?
One view regarding monetary policy is that essentially the problem of optimal
monetary policy has been solved with what is often labelled a "￿ exible" in￿ ation
targeting rule. That is a rule that does not only target a given level of in￿ ation
but allow for a richer reaction of Central Bank policy to many shocks. The rule
described above is an extremely simple (simplistic perhaps) illustrative version
of one of those rules which in reality would of course be much more complicated








t = E(￿t) and solve by simple algebra remembering that E("t) = 0 for the public.
8This kind of ￿ exible in￿ ation targeting rule would "end" the discussion about
institutional arrangements for monetary policy for either one of two reasons.
One is that Central Banks can indeed commit to such a rule so that the time
inconsistency problem is not even there anymore because Central Banks do not
face those "temptations" of deviating from a pre announced rule.
If indeed the temptation were not even there (which in this model would
imply that k = 0) that is the Central Bank did not have any incentives ex post
to deviate from a pre announced course of action, then indeed the only issue left
for monetary policy would be to explain as carefully as possible to the market
what the optimal rule is. There would be no disagreement about monetary
policy neither ex ante nor ex post and the question would be purely technical of
￿nding out the optimal rule. Any discussion of rules versus discretion, Central
Bank independence, optimal institutional arrangements would be meaningless,
the question would simply be of ￿nding the optimal monetary reaction function.
The alternative interpretation is that indeed Central Banks have found ways
of committing. Even though ex post they may want to deviate, they would not
do it because of the perceived loss of reputation. How would that work? Suppose
that the shock " is (ex post) perfectly observable. Then it is easy to check
whether the policymaker has followed the rule or deviated from it. Repeated
interaction and the reputation and credibility built by the policymaker would
sustain the ￿rst best. With any reasonable long term horizon these deviations
from the optimal rules would disappear in equilibrium.
2.5 May be not
But things may not be that simple. Suppose, more realistically perhaps, that
the shock " is not directly and immediately observable by the public. Then the
latter cannot perfectly verify whether the rule has been followed or not. That is
the public cannot detect whether a burst of in￿ ation is due to a deviation from
the rule or a particularly "bad" realization of ": In this case reputation based
models tend to break down.
We can think of course of a multitude of shocks hitting the economy in the
present and in the immediate future, shocks to which, in principle, policy could
react to. Some of these shocks are easily observable others are not. Whether or
not the rule has been followed is especially di¢ cult to detect if the monetary rule
is contingent on the Central Bank expectations of future shocks. Then, the pol-
icymaker may have to face a choice: either follow a simple, non contingent rule
with constant expected in￿ ation (which would be zero, in our example) or the
discretionary policy ￿D
t : In other words let￿ s assume that reputational mech-
anism break down because of the complexity and observability of the optimal
rule and let￿ s examine a simple trade o⁄ between a simple rule and discretion
The loss of discretion (LD) is lower than the simple rule (LSR) if and only if:
￿2
" > k2(1 + b) (16)
9Condition (16) can easily be obtained by computing the expected costs of
the discretionary policy and comparing it with the expected costs of the simple
rule ￿SR = 0:
What does this condition mean? The ￿rst best rule is contingent upon the
realization of one, in general, many shocks. If a rule is "too complicated " it
is not veri￿able by the public. Complicated contingent rules make monetary
policy unpredictable. The lack of predictability has costs which in this simple
model are captured by an increase in average in￿ ation due to a return to dis-
cretionary equilibrium. The parameter k represents the cost of "discretion" ,
namely the cost of not having a monetary policy rule. These costs could be
modeled much more broadly, for instance all the costs due to market instability
due to "guessing games" about the future costs of monetary policy. Assuming
then that the ￿rst best rule which may be contingent on a vast number of vari-
ables is unenforceable, the second best implies a choice between "discretion"
and a "simple rule"; the condition which makes one or the other preferable is
given in (16). If the variance of the environment is large, than the bene￿ts
of the partial stabilization allowed by discretion overcome its costs. To put it
slightly di⁄erently, if one believes that monetary policy can and should react to
a multitude of shocks and has much latitude in stabilizing them, than discretion
is the best course of action. If one believes that there is relatively little than
monetary policy can do any way and very few shocks can and should be accom-
modated than a rigid rule is preferable. These considerations seem to capture
the rhetoric of real world discussions about pros and cons of monetary rules.
Also a change of the environment for a relatively "calm" one with low ￿2
" to a
more turbulent time may switch the bene￿t from a simple rule to discretion, an
issue to which we now turn to.
2.6 Rules versus discretion during crises
Consider now the distinction between normal times, and crisis. We can think
of the former as a situation in which the environment summarized by the shock
" turns extremely negative, that is a very low probability event with a large
(in absolute value) and negative realization of "; a war, or, more interestingly
given recent events, of a major ￿nancial crisis. An alternative way of thinking
of a crisis is an increase in the variance of the shock, ￿2
". In a crisis ￿ exibility
may be the primary need of monetary policy. In the language of the model the
temptation to create unexpected in￿ ation in a period when output is especially
far from its target (remember that costs of deviations from target are quadratic)
than the enforcement may not be enough to compensate for it and the simple
rule is abandoned. Then we should expect rigid rules to break down in a crisis
or, in an alternative interpretation, in a crisis ￿2
" increases su¢ ciently much so
that based upon the inequality above, discretion becomes preferable to a simple
rule.
However, one can also think of an institutional arrangement based upon
rules with escape clauses; namely a simple veri￿able rule with the clause that
it would be abandoned in the case of war or major crisis. But in order for an
10escape clause to be enforceable as such it has to be very clearly speci￿ed. A
major war could be an example, which is easily veri￿able. But what about a
"major" ￿nancial crisis? How does one de￿ne "major"? How deep the crisis and
the recession has to be? This enforcement problems have the same nature of
those discussed above in the context of enforcing rules based upon non perfectly
observable events.
Should we then conclude that in a moment of crisis any simple rule, like
in￿ ation targeting should be abandoned? Perhaps, but there are several caveats.
1) A ￿nancial crisis inducing a deep recession will lower in￿ ation forecast.
Therefore even a simple in￿ ation targeting rule would imply loosening monetary
policy without any need of abandoning in￿ ation targeting. In the language of
our model, this means that a ￿nancial crisis does not require a switch of regime,
condition (16) is not satis￿ed and the simple rule continues to be superior.
2) One may argue that uncertainty about monetary policy (i.e. abandoning
an established credible rule) may increase uncertainty in ￿nancial markets and
make the crisis even worse. In the language of our model this implies than an
increase in ￿2
" holding k constant would lead the policymaker to abandon the
simple rule, but abandoning it would lead to an increase in k, namely to costs of
discretion, modeled broadly. Therefore the rule would be preferable even with
an increase in ￿2
":
3)A ￿nancial crisis may highlight a problem of asymmetry, which most mod-
els do not capture. The incentive to abandon the rule when the shock " is large
and negative may be much bigger than when the shock " is large and positive.
If we interpret the shock " as a proxy of turbulence in ￿nancial markets, this
means that the policymakers may have a stronger incentive to intervene heavily
in ￿nancial crises (i.e. when, for instance, stock markets are falling) than when
markets are booming, perhaps because of bubbles. That of course creates all
sort of moral hazard issues in ￿nancial markets15.
4) If targeting ￿nancial variables really means using a symmetric rule, to
be applied to both upswing and downswing in the market, it could be justi￿ed
using our "skeleton model" in two ways. One is that the one optimal contingent
rule ￿￿ given in (7) should react to shocks even in ￿nancial markets. In addition
this rule is enforceable and sustainable by reputation forces.
Finally note that thus far in this subsection we have implicitly assumed that
a ￿nancial crisis was exogenous to monetary policy. However one may argue
that the latter may indeed be partly responsible for the crisis. For instance
Taylor (2009) amongst others argues that the Fed starting in 2002 abandoned
a Taylor rule, created uncertainty in ￿nancial markets, kept interest rate too
low, all factors that contributed to the crisis. The reason might have been a
misguided attempt at avoiding a recession in the early 2000 and/or a fear of
de￿ ation. Low interest rates for too long, the story goes, have created one of
the roots of excessive risk taking in search of higher returns and the real estate
bubble in the US.
15To some extent problems of asymmetry between positive and negative shocks may be
relevant even for the "basic" model in normal cycles, but in the event of ￿nancial instability
the issues of asymmetry is magni￿ed.
112.7 Other interpretations of "rules versus discretion"
The in￿ ation bias discussed above is illustrative of a more general issue of "rules
versus discretion" and of ￿ exibility versus rigidity in monetary policy. First the
incentive of in￿ ating away public debts with unexpected in￿ ation has similar
implications. This is an issue which was especially common in developing coun-
tries, 16 but also in high in￿ ation countries in the eighties in Europe (e.g. Italy,
Belgium, Greece, etc.). Leaving aside the extreme case of hyperin￿ ations, in
many cases bursts of in￿ ation have reduced the real value of government debt.
The large increase in government debts which will follow the current ￿nancial
crisis may make this question especially relevant and this is a case in which
political pressure on Central Banks may be especially intense. The discussion
which we had above applies mutatis mutandis to the ex post incentive to devalue
the debt.17
Second, and this is especially relevant for the ￿nancial crisis of 2008/9, the
Central Bank (together with the Treasury) may have incentives to announce no
"bail out" policies to create incentives to more prudent behavior of large ￿nancial
institutions, but then, ex post, it has an incentive to provide liquidity and tax
payer money to insure and save the same institutions. Similar considerations
apply here: should Central banks have "rules" ￿xed in stone ex ante so that
decisions about bail out are ￿xed irrevocably, or should they have the ￿ exibility
of intervening ex post? Recent events have really moved this question at the
center stage. Much of the discussion of rules versus discretion above applies to
this case as well. In principle a policy of "no bail out" if perfectly credible would
enforce prudent behavior by large ￿nancial institutions. On the other hand how
credible ex post would such a policy be? The incentive to deviate from it would
be enormous as we have seen.
Third, how constrained should the Central bank policy response be to a ￿-
nancial crisis? During the recent crisis the Fed has engaged in activities and pur-
chases of assets which were usual and required changes in laws and regulations,
often creating delays, uncertainty in markets and di¢ culties for policymakers.
Even this issue can be interpreted as one of rules versus discretion. Should
Central Bank have a wide latitude of pursuing "unusual" or heterodox policies
in term of crisis or should Central Bank policies be restrained by unchangeable
rules, for instance regarding which type of assets Central Banks can buy and
sell? Once again this can be viewed as another application of the question of
rules versus discretion. We return on these issues below.
16See the Chapter by Je⁄ Frankel in this volume on monetary policy in developing countries.
17It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to review the literature of monetary and ￿scal
policy coordination and various time inconsistency problems associated with it. For a classic
treatment see Lucas and Stokey (1983) and for a review of the literature Persson and Tabellini
(2000)
123 Central Bank Independence
The question of how far removed should monetary policy be from politics has
been at the center of attention for decades. Academics, commentators, politi-
cians and Central Bankers have worried about the optimal degree of indepen-
dence of Central Banks. The question has implications not only for economic
e¢ ciency but also for democratic theory and institutional design, and currently
as a result of the ￿nancial crisis, has come back at the center of the political
debate. We begin by addressing the question of Central Bank independence
from the point of view of the debate of rules versus discretion and below we
turn to democratic theory and the recent crisis.
3.1 Rules, Discretion and Central Bank Independence
As a potentially superior alternative to the choice between a simple rule and
discretion, Rogo⁄ (1985) suggested an ingenious solution. Assuming that the
parameter b represents the socially accepted relative cost of deviation of output
from target relative to the deviation of in￿ ation from target, society should
appoint a Central Bank with a lower "b" than society itself. This person would
be a "conservative" central banker, in the sense that he/she would care relatively
more about in￿ ation and less about output than society18.
The in￿ ation under discretion set by the conservative central banker is:
￿D
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By minimizing L with respect to ^ b society can choose the central banker that
most e⁄ectively ￿ghts in￿ ation in the interests of society. Rogo⁄ (1985) proved
that such a central banker will be more conservative than society in the sense
that 0 < ^ b < b . In Appendix we review the derivation of this result. The
intuition is that choosing ^ b < b allows to optimize over the trade o⁄ between
the rigidity of the zero in￿ ation rule and the ￿ exibility with in￿ ation bias of
discretion.
Central Bank independence is a requirement because ex post after the real-
ization of the shock the policymaker (the principal of the Central Bank) would
want to dismiss the conservative central banker and choose in￿ ation ex post
following his own objective function rather than the more conservative one of
18Note that, of course if society could appoint a policymaker with k=0, that is that does
not target an output level above the market generated one the entire problem would be solved
and the ￿rst best solution would be enforceable. The idea is that k is not really a preference
parameter but the undistorted full employment level of output.
13the central banker. Thus the solution of the time inconsistency problem works
if the central banker cannot be dismissed ex post, namely if it is independent
and can resist political pressures.
3.2 More or less Central Bank Independence in times of
crisis?
Suppose that ex post one observes a really bad realization of the shock, i.e. " is
very negative. The independent Central Bank would follow the policy:
^ ￿
CB











where with the ￿
p
t notation we capture the discretionary policy which would
be followed if the politicians had the control of monetary policy. Note that
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this di⁄erence becomes larger the larger in absolute value is the negative
realization of "t (remember that ^ b < b):
So if " is very large (and negative), the in￿ ation rate chosen by the CB
would be much less than what the policymakers would choose. With a little
algebra one can show that ex post the temptation of the policymaker to "￿re"
the Central Banker and choose a more in￿ ationary policy is increasing in the
absolute value of "19. Obviously without any cost of ￿ring the Central Bank ex
post, the arrangement of the conservative Central Banker would not be credible
and only the discretionary policy with the parameter "b" of the policymaker
would be enforceable. With "in￿nite" costs the policymaker could never ￿re the
Central Banker with any realization of ".
Lohmann (1992) extends Rogo⁄￿ s model and shows that, in fact, the optimal
institutional arrangement is to have positive costs of "￿ring" the Central Banker,
but not in￿nite costs. This argument is similar to a rule with escape clauses.
That is, in normal times, with realizations of " below a certain threshold the
Central Bank is allowed to follow a policy based upon ^ b. But for large realization
of " the policymaker takes control of monetary policy and would ￿re the Central
Banker if the latter did not accommodate. In anticipation of this, and in order
19Once again the model is, for simplicity, symmetric even though the "story" seems espe-
cially realistic in one direction.
14to avoid incurring into a "￿ring" procedure, the Central Bank accommodates
the desires of the policymaker for realization of " above a certain threshold (in
absolute value) which is determined by the condition of the equality of the costs
(institutional, etc.) to eliminate Central Bank independence and the cost of not
"accommodating" enough the shock ". This arrangement generates a non linear
policy rule: above a certain threshold the policy re￿ ects not the central banker￿ s
conservative cost function, but that of the society￿ s.
Thus, in this model, the degree of Central Bank independence varies, in
normal times there is independence in period of crisis there is none. Notice
that this institutional arrangement is fully understood by a rational public.
Therefore there would no surprise in the conduct of monetary policy even at this
switching point. This is of course easier said than done. In practice who decides
when a crisis is such? Uncertainty about the switching point introduces lack
of predictability of monetary policy, perhaps precisely when it is most needed,
that is in relatively turbulent times when the public may wonder whether the
economy and ￿nancial markets are entering a crisis or not. However this model
highlights in a simpli￿ed form an issue which is quite hot today in the US in
the aftermath of the ￿nancial crisis, namely whether the Fed should have less
or more independence. We return to this issue below.
3.3 Independent Central Banks and rules
We have presented the case for independent and conservative Central Bank as
an alternative to a policy rule. One could think of institutional arrangements
which are a mixtures of policy rules enforced by independent Central Bankers.
Two have been discussed in the literature.
3.3.1 Instrument versus goal independence
One argument put forward by Fischer and Debelle (1994) is that the policy
goal, say the target level of in￿ ation, should be chosen by elected politicians,
while the Central Bank should have the independence of choosing the policy
instruments more appropriate to achieve that goal. That is the Central Bank
could choose whether to target, say, interest rates or quantities of credit and/or
money in order to implement the goals chosen by politicians.
This is a rather "minimalist" view of the meaning of Central Bank indepen-
dence. If policy goals and therefore rules can be changed at will by politicians
it is unclear how "instrument independence" would solve the problem of com-
mitment. To put it di⁄erently, nobody would probably argue against the view
that the legislature should stay out of the intricacies of the day to day choices
of interest rates, discount rates and quantities of credit or money supply. The
question is whether politicians should be free to choose the direction of monetary
policy or whether this decision should be delegated to an independent author-
ity. One may or may not agree with the idea of Central Bank independence.
15But the "compromise" of instrument independence does not reconcile the two
views, it is essentially a re￿nement of the idea that Central Banks should not
be independent, at least for what really matters.
3.3.2 The Contracting approach
Another "mixed" approach is the "contracting" approach to Central Banking,
as in work by Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1995a). In this model
the appointed central banker has the same utility function of the social planner.
The Central Bank can choose monetary policy independently but "Society"
(i.e. the policymaker, the principal of the Central Bank) sets up a system
of punishments and rewards which would induce the Central Bank to follow
the ￿rst best policy and avoid the in￿ ation bias problem. These authors show
that in the model discussed above in the present paper, a very simple incentive
scheme, linear in in￿ ation, would enforce the ￿rst best. This scheme essentially
punishes the Central banker as a linear function of the deviation of in￿ ation from
the ￿rst best.20 In general the idea of introducing incentives, even contractual
incentives in the public sector is an interesting and valid one. Whether it is
usefully applicable to monetary policy is questionable and this approach after
some initial enthusiasm has died down.
In theory it is reasonably straightforward to devise a contract that creates
the right incentives for implementing the optimal policy. In reality there are
complex practical issues of implementation similar in spirit to our discussion
above concerning the rigidity versus ￿ exibility of monetary rules. The veri￿ca-
tion of whether a "contract" has been violated or not is tricky. Implementation
of "punishment" in case of violation of a contract by a Central Banker may
be "ex post" politically costly especially in turbulent times and in periods of
￿nancial instability.
3.4 Central bank independence and macroeconomic per-
formance: The evidence
How do independent Central Banks behave, relative to those which are less so?
What is the correlation between in￿ ation, unemployment, and other indicators
of monetary policy with Central Bank Independence?
A large literature has tried to answer this question. The ￿rst step in this
endeavor is to measure Central Bank independence. The early literature focused
on the statutes of the central banks to evaluate their degree of independence.
Four characteristics have emerged as crucial: ￿rst the process of appointment
of the management, who is in charge of it, how often it occurs and how long
is the tenure. Obviously the Central Bank is more independent the less politi-
cized is the appointment process and the more secure is the tenure; second the
20A much popularized proposal in New Zealand (which was actually never implemented)
was to link the salary of the head of the Central Banker to the achievement of a pre-speci￿ed
in￿ation target (see Walsh (1995b)).
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cal authority can participate in and overturn the policy decisions of the Central
Banks; third the presence of a clear objective, like in￿ ation targeting; last but
not least ￿nancial independence. These measures seem reasonable, but many
have criticized them for two reasons. First the law cannot foresee all possible
contingencies and even when it does it is not necessarily applied. In addition,
especially in developing countries written rules are often circumvented by de
facto procedures. Therefore, one would need de facto measures of the degree
of independence in addition to or even instead of de iure measures, especially
when dealing with developing countries. The actual turnover of central bank
governors is a good example; even if the length of the appointment is speci￿ed
by the law, the actual duration may di⁄er and how often a governor is removed
from o¢ ce is a good proxy of the independence that the central bank enjoys.
Another de facto indicator is derived from survey data, questionnaires are sent
to experts and the answers are used to create an index of independence.
The early literature, Bade and Parkin (1982) Alesina (1988) and Grilli, Mas-
ciandaro and Tabellini (1991) focused on OECD countries and found an inverse
relationship between Central Bank Independence and in￿ ation using de jure
measures of independence. Alesina and Summers (1993) con￿rm these results
and show no evidence of an impact of Central Bank Independence on real vari-
ables, such as growth, unemployment and real interest rates.
Since then many studies have revisited this issue. Many authors have stressed
the di¢ culty in measuring Central Bank Independence and choosing the right
control variables; Campillo and Miron (1997) present some evidence against a
negative correlation of Central Bank Independence with in￿ ation; they perform
cross-country regressions of average in￿ ation rates on country characteristics
￿nding that economic fundamentals like openness, political stability, optimal
tax considerations have a much stronger impact on in￿ ation than institutional
arrangements, like central bank independence. Oatley (1999) employs the same
empirical strategy and ￿nds that by including other controls the signi￿cance of
Central Bank Independence on in￿ ation disappears. Brumm (2000) claims that
previous studies, Campillo and Miron (1997) in particular, do not take into
consideration the presence of strong measurement error and therefore obtain
non robust results; he ￿nds a strong negative correlation between in￿ ation and
Central Bank Independence.
As stressed earlier, the problem is that the legal measures of central bank
independence may not represent actual central bank independence. Cukierman,
Webb and Neyapti (1992) use three indicators of actual independence: the rate
of turnover of central bank governors, an index based on a questionnaire an-
swered by specialists in 23 countries, and an aggregation of the legal index and
the rate of turnover; they also compare these indicators with a de jure mea-
sure showing that the discrepancy is higher for developing countries than for
industrial ones; using data on the period 1960-1980 they ￿nd that Central Bank
Independence has a negative statistically signi￿cant impact on price stability
among industrial countries, but not among developing countries.
The degree of Central Bank Independence might have become less important
17after the period of the great in￿ ation when most countries have converged to
lower and more stable levels of in￿ ation. In fact using de jure measures of
Central Bank Independence the early studies found a statistically signi￿cant
correlation between Central Bank Independence and low in￿ ation for the period
pre 90s. Using the same measures on recent data, 2000-2004, Crowe and Meade
(2007) cannot ￿nd any meaningful statistical relationship; they compute the
rate of turnover with updated data and ￿nd that it has a correlation close
to zero with the de jure measure of Central Bank Independence concluding
that turnover must capture some other dynamics. Klomp and de Haan (2008)
perform a meta regression analysis of studies on the relationship between Central
Bank Independence and in￿ ation ￿nding that the inverse relationship between
Central Bank Independence and in￿ ation in OECD countries is sensitive to the
indicator used and the estimation period chosen; they also ￿nd that there are no
signi￿cant di⁄erences between studies based on a cross-country or panel settings.
These results on the (alleged) bene￿cial e⁄ects of central bank independence
seem to have been internalized by the politicians and the public opinion. In
fact, in the last quarter of the 20th century there has been a global movement
towards more independence of monetary authorities. Crowe and Meade (2007)
study the evolution of central bank independence using data from Cukierman,
Webb and Neyapti (1992). They replicate their index using data from 2003
and broadening the sample adding Eastern European countries amongst others;
they then compare their 2003 index with that of Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti
(1992) noting that Central Bank Independence has increased. Eighty-￿ve per-
cent of the central banks in 2003 had a score above 0.4, compared with only 38
percent in the 1980s and average independence has risen from 0.3 in the 1980s
to above 0.6 in 2003. They also break the sample in two groups, advanced and
emerging economies, ￿nding that both experienced an increase in Central Bank
Independence but such increase is greater in developing countries, two thirds of
the 15 central banks that are rated as highly independent, with scores above
0.8, are eastern European countries.
Crowe and Meade (2008) push the analysis further: looking at the change in
the level of the four indexes above mentioned, they note that in the developing
countries all of the indexes show a statistically signi￿cant increase since the
1980s, but in the advanced economies only the second and the fourth show a
statistically signi￿cant increase, mainly because central banks in these countries
were already scoring very high in the ￿rst and third index. They then perform
a regression analysis to highlight the determinants of the reforms to Central
Bank Independence; reform is correlated with low initial levels of Central Bank
Independence and high prior in￿ ation, meaning that the failure of past anti-
in￿ ationary policies led to more independence for the central bank; reform is also
correlated with democracy and less ￿ exible initial exchange rates. Acemoglu,
Johnson, Querubin and Robinson (2008) measure Central Bank Independence
by considering only the reforms to the charter of the monetary authority and
constructing a simple dummy which takes a value of 1 in every year after a major
reform to the Constitution or central bank law leading to increased independence
and zero elsewhere. They ￿nd that most of the reforms in the post Bretton-
18Woods period 1972-2005 took place in the 1990s.
3.5 Causality
Regardless of whether or not the correlations shown above between Central Bank
Independence and in￿ ation are robust, there is also an issue of causality as Posen
(1993,1995) pointed out. Can we really say that Central Bank independence
"causes" low in￿ ation or that countries which prefer (for whatever reason) low
in￿ ation choose to delegate monetary policy to independent Central Banks?
The question is well posed, since institutions are generally not imposed ex-
ogenously (with few exceptions) on a country and they are slow moving and
path dependent.21 Posen argues that Central Bank Independence really lead to
a reduction of in￿ ation in OECD countries only when it re￿ ects an underlying
agreement in society about lowering in￿ ation or when groups that prefer low
and stable in￿ ation to other policies are predominant in society. He points to
several characteristics of the ￿nancial sector and some political characteristics
of the country. One in particular is the degree of fractionalization of the party
system which is correlated with budget de￿cits and in￿ ation (Grilli Mascian-
daro and Tabellini (1991) and Perotti and Kontopoulos (1999) amongst others).
Fractionalized systems may have an especially hard time delegating monetary
policy to independent experts given the con￿ icts amongst groups. One may
argue, incidentally, that fractionalization of party systems is itself not an exoge-
nous variable but is the result of deeper socio economic and historical charac-
teristics of a country (Aghion Alesina and Trebbi (2004)). In fact fractionalized
systems may be those that are more in need of an independent Central Bank
committed to stopping various pressures that lead to in￿ ation but such systems
may or may not be able to achieve that institutional arrangement.22
This author concludes that it is an illusion to think that simply imposing an
independent central bank in a country that for whatever reason is not ready to
accept low in￿ ation will work. and this may explain the murky correlation be-
tween de iure measure of CBI in developing countries versus OECD countries.23
This is a valuable point. Nevertheless a country with a problem of high in￿ ation
may use an increase in CBI as something that helps achieving that goal. While
an independent central bank dropped in a society non at all intolerant of high
in￿ ation may serve very little purposes, a move towards more independence in
21See Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) and Trebbi Aghion and Alesina (2008) for discus-
sions about the issues of "endogenous institutions" in more general terms.
22Posen makes similar argument, perhaps less convincingly, regarding federal systems versus
a centralized systems.
23There have been a couple of attempts at using instrumental variable to address endo-
geneity. problems Crowe and Meade (2008) employ both an IV and a Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood strategies ￿nding a statistically signi￿cant negative e⁄ect of CBI on
in￿ation; as instruments they use two governance measures, the rule of law and voice and
accountability. Jacome and Vazquez (2005) present evidence based on Latin American and
Caribbean data in favor of a negative relationship between CBI and in￿ation; but they also
￿nd that using instrumental variables the signi￿cance of the correlation goes away.
19a country were anti in￿ ation sentiments are present but yet not strong enough
may help. To put it di⁄erently, from a normative point of view, it would be a
good idea for a social planner to recommend, in our view, to an hypothetical
new country to adopt a systems with an independent central bank. Nevertheless
Posen￿ s argument is well taken in the sense that if in this hypothetical country
there are not enough political interests to allow this institutional arrangement
to survive, it would not.24 Also once an independent Central Bank has been es-
tablished, institutional inertia and a risk of loosing institutional credibility may
protect, at least up to a point, direct and frontal attacks to that institution.
3.6 Independent Central Banks: a democratic de￿cit?
In the previous section we have reviewed some of the potential bene￿ts of an
independent authority taking charge of an important policy area: monetary
policy. But, this leaves open two questions. First, isn￿ t there a democratic de￿cit
in allowing an independent bureaucracy to make important policy decisions?
Second, if the time inconsistency issue is the only justi￿cation for this delegation
why single out only monetary policy? What is so special about monetary policy?
Time inconsistency problems are not a prerogative of monetary policy. Think
only of ￿scal policy, full of dynamic inconsistencies, not to mention non economic
examples, like foreign policy where commitment versus ￿ exibility is also a key
trade-o⁄.
On the ￿rst question, Drazen (2002) correctly argues that there is nothing
non democratic in delegating certain policies to independent agencies and the
nature of monetary policy makes it an ideal candidate for delegation. This is
because monetary policy can be easily used strategically by politicians to achieve
short term goals with cost hard to detect for the voters for possibly a long time.
He also argues that there is probably much more agreement about the "correct"
long run goal for monetary policy than ￿scal policy.
Thus, having established that there is nothing antidemocratic in setting up
independent agencies to pursue certain policy goals, the question is which poli-
cies should be delegated and which ones should not. Alesina and Tabellini
(2007,2008) formally address these questions using a normative and a positive
model of delegation 25. From a normative point of view these authors ask the
question of whether society might bene￿t in delegating certain tasks to bu-
reaucrats, taking them away from direct control of politicians. They focus on
a di⁄erent incentive structure between the two types of policymakers. Politi-
cians￿ s goal is to be reelected and to do so they need to provide enough utility
to a majority of the voters. Voters are rational, and have a minimum threshold
of utility that they expect from an incumbent. Bureaucrats instead have career
concerns. They want to appear as competent as possible looking ahead toward
24On this issue see also Acemoglu et al. (2008).
25Their model builds upon Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999 a,b). For a review of
the literature on pros and cons of delegation see Epstein and O￿ Halloran (1999). For recent
contributions by economists on issues of delegation see Besley and Gathak (2005), Maskin
and Tirole (2001) and Schultz (2003).
20future employment opportunities26. Voters cannot distinguish e⁄ort from in-
nate ability: they only observe policy results which are a combination of the
two. Applying e⁄ort to an activity is costly for both bureaucrats and politicians.
Given these di⁄erent incentive structures, it is optimal for society to delegate
certain types of activities to non elected bureaucrats with career concerns, while
others are better left in the hands of elected politicians. Delegation to bureau-
crats is especially bene￿cial for tasks in which there is imperfect monitoring of
e⁄ort and talent is very important because of the technical nature of the tasks.
The intuition is that in technical issues where monitoring is uncertain, career
concerned bureaucrats are eager to invest much e⁄ort to signal their ability.
Politicians instead only need a minimum threshold to win a majority and since
there is di¢ culty in distinguishing e⁄ort and ability have lower incentives than
bureaucrats to invest in e⁄ort. Tasks with the opposite characteristics instead
create the opposite incentives. To the extent that monetary policy is a policy
task relatively technical in nature and where the "ability" of who is in charge is
relatively hard to judge, than it would be a good candidate for delegation to a
career bureaucrat. The idea that career bureaucrats might be better at technical
tasks is reinforced if judging their ability is also a prerogative of specialists27.
Note that this result is not based on the assumption that career bureaucrats are
intrinsically more able than career politicians in dealing with technical issues;
obviously such an assumption would reinforce the result.
Alesina and Tabellini (2007,2008) also analyze a "positive" model of dele-
gation, namely the case in which politicians can delegate or not certain tasks
to bureaucrats having in mind their objective function, namely reelection. One
result which is quite important for our discussion of monetary policy versus
￿scal policy is that politicians prefer not delegate redistributive policies. The
reason is that they are critical to build minimum winning coalition amongst
voters. Packaging redistributive ￿ ows from income groups to income groups,
regions to regions, lobbies to lobbies is what politics is mostly about. This is
a reason while ￿scal policy is virtually never delegated to independent agencies
even though it is plagued by time inconsistency problems just as much, if not
more than monetary policy28. To be sure monetary policy has redistributive
aspects as well. More or less in￿ ation, a more or less active anti-cyclical policy
certainly has redistributive implication. But these redistributive ￿ ows are less
clear and direct than those caused by ￿scal policy such as, for instance, an in-
crease in the progressivity of the income tax or a tax or subsides for this or that
sector or this or that income group. For these reasons politicians may be more
willing to grant independence to Central Bank more than they would with an
independent Treasury.
26In reality the distinction between the two incentive structures may not be so stark. Politi-
cians may also look for future employment opportunities and bureaucrats may want to enter
politics.
27On related points see Maskin and Tirole (2004) and Epstein and O￿ Halloran (1999).
28See Blinder (1997) for arguments in favor of the social optimality of delegation of certain
aspects of ￿scal policy and, along similar lines, Council of Australia (1999).
21In summary, Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008) argue that monetary policy,
in addition to the time inconsistency issue, is a good candidate for delegation to
an independent agency. It is a relatively technical task where it is often di¢ cult
to attribute blame and praise. It is a task where career oriented bureaucrats
may have superior incentives than politicians to perform well. It is also a task
that politicians may be willing to delegate (at least up to a point) because of its
less than direct and clear redistributive and coalition building e⁄ects. Also an
independent Central bank may also serve occasionally as a perfect scapegoat for
politicians: when the economy is not doing well having an non elected o¢ cial
to be blamed is a welcome opportunity.
3.7 Monetary Policy By Committee
Thus far even when analyzing politico economic models of Central Banks like
in the subsection above, we always though of a Central Banks as a single agent
making decisions. In reality monetary policy is conducted by committees. Pol-
lard (2004) conducted a survey of Central Banks around the world ￿nding that
most of them made monetary policy by committee, 79 out of 88. Blinder (2007)
discusses this worldwide trend and why most countries prefer their monetary
policy to be the ￿nal result of a joint e⁄ort rather than to be in the hands
of just one individual. Blinder and Morgan (2008) present some experimental
evidence which shows that groups make decisions as fast or faster than individu-
als; committees also provide more diversi￿cation, a larger and richer knowledge
base and a system of checks and balances. Policy-making by committee opens
the interesting issue of how decisions are a⁄ected by heterogeneity among the
members of the committee. The Bank of England constitutes an interesting
case study with its monetary policy committee consisting of ￿ve internal and
four external members. Hansen and McMahon (2008) ￿nd that external mem-
bers vote as internal ones at the beginning, but after a year start voting for
lower interest rates; consistently with these results Gerlach- Kristen (2009) ￿nd
that outsiders dissent more often than insiders and prefer lower rates. The
next step is trying to understand why there are such persistent di⁄erences in
the behavior of the two groups; career concerns could be an explanation, in-
ternal members may be interested in signaling themselves as tough in￿ ation
￿ghters and external members may want to be recognized by future employers
as business-friendly economists. Both authors reject an explanation based on
career concerns; Hansen and McMahon (2008) run a battery of tests, for in-
stance they argue that tenured academics should have less of an incentive to
signal their competence and therefore test whether academics behave di⁄erently
from non-academics and ￿nd that they do not; they also test the di⁄erence in
the behavior of external members between a period when it was impossible to
be reappointed in the committee and a period when it was possible, ￿nding
no statistical di⁄erence. If incentives-base explanations do not work an alter-
native could be found in the preferences of the agents; Gerlach-Kristen (2009)
proposes a model where "recession averse" outsiders have di⁄erent preferences
from insiders.
22Di⁄erent frameworks can be used to model monetary policy making by com-
mittee. Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010) present ￿ve: a consensus model, where
a supermajority is required to reach a decision; an agenda-setting model, where
decisions are taken with a simple majority rule, but the agenda is set by the
chairman of the committee; a dictator model, where the chairman decides the
interest rate and ￿nally a simple majority model, where the decision is taken by
the median voter. Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010) estimate these ￿ve models by
maximum-likelihood using data from ￿ve central banks: the Bank of Canada,
the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Swedish Riksbank and
the US Federal Reserve. They ￿nd that the consensus model ￿ts actual policy
decisions better than the alternative models.
3.8 Central Bank Independence and the Financial Crisis
The joint appearances in front of Congress of the Treasury Secretary (Paulson)
and the Chairman of the Fed (Bernanke) in the worst period of the crisis have
been a symbolic event which has called into question the relationship between
the Fed and the Treasury and (in the background) the authorities for ￿nancial
supervision. Was the Fed under pressure from the Treasury, or, conversely,
was the Fed overstepping its mandate and spending taxpayers money? Has the
US lost the distinction between monetary policy (delegated to an independent
Fed) and ￿scal policy, controlled by Congress and the Treasury? It is indeed
widely recognized that the Fed￿ s action during the ￿nancial crisis have had
substantial costs for the taxpayers. The Fed has taken decisions which were
￿scal in nature.29
One can read these events in two almost opposite ways. One is to say that
the Fed needed to go beyond the limit of what its Statute allowed this institution
to do, for instance which assets to purchase, how to intervene to rescue large
￿nancial institutions etc. In fact, the argument continues, the desperate cry for
more discretion by the Fed in public appearances in front of Congress increased
the perceived panic in the market. Or, to put it di⁄erently, the Chairman of
the Fed had to paint the situation in even more dramatic tones than it actually
was to receive more authority from Congress. In addition, delays in obtaining
such authority might have worsened the situation. This argument would go in
the direction of invoking even more independence and latitude for the Fed in
moment of crisis when extraordinary situations require quick action. In fact, as
we argued above, discretion may be an especially valuable asset in moment of
crisis when rules which work in normal times have to be abandoned because too
restrictive.
On the other hand, to the extent that the Fed takes actions which imply costs
for the taxpayers, the opposite view holds, than the latter (i.e. the taxpayers)
should have their say through their representatives: "no taxation without rep-
resentation". In addition, the argument continues, the Fed has been "captured"
by the interest of the ￿nancial industry both before and during the crisis. Be-
29See Zingales (2009) for an especially vehement denunciation.
23fore the crisis the excessively low interest rates fueled excessive risk (and pro￿t)
taking and during the crisis this excessive risk was "covered" by bailouts with
taxpayers￿money.
It is the second line of argument that has led to some political movements in
Congress to try to limit the Fed independence and increase political supervision.
The motivations are in part understandable,30 but the question is whether a
politically more controlled Fed would have acted di⁄erently or would have made
matter worse. After all "regulatory capture" by a certain industry can and does
occur even with respect to Congress. Not only, but a politically controlled Fed
may later run into the problem highlighted above of time inconsistency. The
large public debt accumulated by the US might become an incentive to in￿ ate to
which a less independent Central Bank may ￿nd it harder to resist. An indebted
government controlling the printing press has never been a good idea and has
often been the primary cause of large in￿ ations.
However the renewed debate on the role of the Fed raises important politico-
economic issue regarding the optimal allocation of regulatory power and the
relationship between monetary policy and ￿nancial stability. It is only in the
aftermath of the recent crisis that economists have turned their attention with
su¢ cient energy to these questions and it is fair to say that a consensus has not
yet emerged.
3.9 Financial regulation and monetary policy
It is widely agreed that the pre crisis ￿nancial regulatory framework of the US
was vastly suboptimal. It seems the result of an accumulation of regulatory
bodies born in response to various historical events and crises, and which devel-
oped into an uncoordinated institutional system lacking coherence.31 The need
for a reform is vastly shared but the agreement pretty much stops here.
There are two possible institutional arrangements. One in which ￿nancial
supervision is done by the Fed and another arrangement in which the Fed con-
trols monetary policy (i.e. interest rates) and another agency (or agencies) deal
with ￿nancial supervision of the banking system and prudential control.32 These
di⁄erent arrangements have to be judged from three points of view: democratic
theory, the potential for regulatory capture and their economic e¢ ciency and
not all three criteria may give the same ranking.
Consider ￿rst the case in which the Central Bank has the task of monetary
policy and supervision of the banking system. One e¢ ciency argument in favor
of it is that the level of interest rates in￿ uences through a variety of channels
30A more cynical reading of the events would be that some politicians are using the "excuse"
of the crisis simply to regain control of the Fed, something which they wanted independently
of the crisis itself.
31For instance the Federal Deposit Insurance was born in 1933 in response to the bank runs
of the previous years. The Security and Exchange Commission came about in 1934 to prevent
the repetition of stock market manipulations of the 1920s. The O¢ ce of Thrift Supervision
was created in 1989 in response to the Savings and Loan crisis.
32See Alesina Carasquilla and Steiner (2005) for some data on which countries have adopted
which system around the world.
24the degree of risk taking of banks and other ￿nancial institutions and interbank
lending. This has been de￿ned as a "risk taking" channel of monetary policy.33.
In other words, interest rate policies a⁄ect bank balance sheets and bank de-
cisions in ways that create incentives for more risk taking and shortening of
maturities when interest rates are low and vice-versa. 34 Not only, but cyclical
￿ uctuations also a⁄ect capital requirements making them pro-cyclical, given the
provisions of the Basel II standards. Thus, to the extent that monetary pol-
icy has an anti-cyclical component the latter interferes with ￿nancial fragility.
An e¢ ciency argument for moving ￿nancial supervision at the Fed, therefore
is quite reasonable. For instance Blanchard, Dell Ariccia and Mauro (2010)
and Feldstein (2010) has endorsed this view. The latter concludes that "while
a Council of Supervisors and regulators can play a useful role in dealing with
macro prudential risk it should not replace the Central Role of the Fed".35
However from the point of view of democratic theory one could raise an
eyebrow (Zingales (2009)). The goals of ￿nancial stability and that of in￿ ation
targeting imply trading o⁄ some objectives against each other. Provision of liq-
uidity to avoid banking crisis may come at the cost of giving up in￿ ation control.
In times of ￿nancial turbulence there are complex redistributive e⁄ects involved
especially if when a crisis occurs the Fed has a wide latitude in deciding who
and how much to bail out. Is it appropriate, from the point of view of demo-
cratic design, than a non elected bureaucrat (the Chairman of the Fed) makes
such decisions involving taxpayers money and redistribution between ￿nancial
institutions￿stock holders, depositors, tax payers, debtors and creditors?
The alternative is then to assign to the Fed simply the goal of stabilizing
in￿ ation and create another agency for banking supervisions with the goal of
achieving ￿nancial stability, and possibly a third one for consumer protection of
the public, depositors and taxpayers.36 Zingales (2009) argues that this system
would attribute to each agency a speci￿c goal thus increasing transparency
and the possibility of evaluation of the results of each one. No single agency
would have the tools or the mandate to trade o⁄ between goals, a decision left
to the political arena. This arrangement scores high in terms of democratic
theory, since it does not delegate political and redistributive decisions to non
elected o¢ cials. However the question is how much is lost by the Fed in terms of
information needed to conduct monetary policy if the Fed does not supervise the
banking system. If one of the main channels of monetary goes indeed through
the balance sheet of bank and the interbank complex borrowing system, would
the Fed be missing a key ingredient in its tool kit? The jury is still out.
Finally what about "regulatory capture"? In the academic and policy dis-
cussion in the aftermath of the crisis there has been a remarkable little attention
33See Adrian, Estrella and Shin (2009), and Borio and Zhu (2008).
34See Shin (2009), Adrian, Estrella and Shin (2009) and Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009). For
a review of liquidity, credit and risk taking channels of monetary policy see Adrian and Shin
(2010).
35Peek, Rosengreen and Tootell (1999) also argue that a regulator would acquire superior
information which would be useful for monetary policy.
36This is not the place to discuss the complexity of what is an appropriate de￿nition of
￿nancial stability. See Morris and Shin (2008) and Borio and Drehmann (2008)
25to this issue, as if it were a "non issue" and everybody had forgotten Stigler
(1971). In a nut shell the question is whether is it more likely that the Central
Bank or a regulatory agency may fall captured by the industry it is supposed to
supervise, namely the ￿nancial industry. The answer is not obvious. A priori,
economists tend to view Central Banks (at least in advanced democracies) as
incorruptible institutions interested only in performing as well as possible for
the economy as a whole, possibly because economists are involved in leading
these institutions. On the other hand economists tend to view other regulatory
agencies as much more capturable and less competent. But does it have to be
this way? Not necessarily. Even in OECD countries Central Banks may be
captured by the banking industry. As argued above in reference to the Fed, its
critics see the bail out policies of the Fed as a result of an excessive attention
to the interest of Wall Street. In principle it is not impossible to set up a regu-
latory agency with the su¢ cient independence, skill, compensation levels so as
to protect it as well as possible against capture. In the end whether a Central
Bank of a regulatory agency is more easily captured is an empirical question.
One can certainly agree with Feldstein (2010) when he writes cautiously that
"more research and analysis would be desirable before new legislation causes
fundamental institutional changes that would be politically di¢ cult to reverse".
4 Political Business Cycles
Thus far we examined models in which the policymaker maximized social wel-
fare, possibly using an agent (the Central Bank) but there was no con￿ ict of
interest between the policymakers￿objectives and social welfare, nor there was
disagreement amongst individuals about the most proper macroeconomic objec-
tives. We now examine models in which this is not the case anymore, namely we
have self interested politicians and con￿ ict of macroeconomic goals. These are
known as political business cycle models, which can be divided into two groups.
In partisan models the two parties have di⁄erent preferences over in￿ ation and
unemployment, in opportunistic cycles the only objective of the parties is to win
elections and they have no preferences on the economy per se. The literature
on political business cycles has been reviewed extensively in Alesina, Roubini
and Cohen (1997), and Drazen (2000, 2001, 2009a,b). Here we highlight some
key points and focus upon recent research in the area.
4.1 Partisan Cycles
These are models in which di⁄erent parties have di⁄erent objectives over macro-
economic policy. Hibbs (1987) argued that in the post war US the two major
parties have systematically di⁄ered in their emphasis on the relative cost of
in￿ ation and unemployment, the Republican more sensitive to the cost of the
former the Democrat of the latter. His work was empirical and was based on
26an exploitable Phillips curve. Alesina (1987) revisited the issue emphasizing the
role of policy uncertainty when the two potential policymakers do not have the
same objectives. This uncertainty can generate policy cycles even with rational
expectation with some form of stickiness in wage/price adjustment, like a labor
contract model. This model has been labeled the Rational Partisan Theory
and here we brie￿ y review it. The economy is again described by:
yt = ￿t ￿ ￿e
t
The elections take place every other period and two candidates compete for
the o¢ ce: an incumbent and a challenger; expectations are formed rationally.
The left-wing party (L) cares relatively more about growth whereas the right-
wing party (R) cares relatively more about in￿ ation: in the context of our simple















The timing of events is as follows. In every period ￿rst "expectations" (i.e.
wage contacts) are set. Then in an electoral period elections take place and then
in￿ ation is chosen by the winning party. In an "o⁄ year" there are no elections.
By minimizing the loss functions we can ￿nd the in￿ ation that would prevail if
either party wins the elections as a function of expected in￿ ation:
￿L =
bL
1 + bL￿e +
bL
1 + bLk (24)
￿R =
bR
1 + bR￿e +
bR
1 + bRk (25)
If P is the probability that party R wins the election, the expected in￿ ation
in the period after the election will be:
￿e =
bL(1 + bR) ￿ P(bL ￿ bR)
1 + bR + P(bL ￿ bR)
k (26)
Given the expectations of in￿ ation it is easy to determine the levels of in￿ a-
tion and output in the period immediately after the elections:
27￿L =
bL(1 + bR)








1 + bR + P(bL ￿ bR)
k > 0 (29)
yR =
￿(1 ￿ P)(bL ￿ bR)
1 + bR + P(bL ￿ bR)
k < 0 (30)
In the non election period in￿ ation goes back to t ￿ = bik, where i is the
identity of the party in o¢ ce, and output returns to zero. Rational partisan
cycles therefore produce a deviation of output from its natural rate for a period
and the magnitude of this deviation depends on the extent of the political po-
larization. The right-wing party causes recessions because the expectations of
in￿ ation are kept high by the possibility of a victory of the left; the higher the
degree of surprise of the electoral result, the lower the probability P of electing
the right-wing government, the larger the recession. The key insight of the model
is that policy uncertainty due to electoral uncertainty may deliver real e⁄ects
of policy shocks until expectations have adjusted to the new regime. Obviously
one could add additional dynamics by including elements of slow learning over
a new administration true policy objectives
In the simplest version of the model the probability of the electoral result
is taken as exogenous. Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) develop a more general
model in which both electoral result and partisan cycle are endogenous. There
is a distribution of voters preferences over policy objectives and, in addition,
di⁄erent administrations are viewed as more or less "competent" at handling the
economy. Voters look at competence and the closeness of the party￿ s objective
to their own in order to decide who to vote for. Shocks over the distributions
of voters￿preferences generate electoral uncertainty. The same authors also
illustrate the dynamic of electoral cycles at the Presidential and Congressional
level and link the partisan cycle as above to the mid term cycle in congressional
elections. This model can also be extended to allow for policy convergence, i.e.
the parties moderating their platforms to attract middle of the road voters.
4.2 Opportunistic Cycles
In opportunistic cycles politicians have no goals of their own other than the
desire to win elections and remain in o¢ ce as long as possible. There are no
di⁄erences in policy objectives. Nordhaus (1975) analyzes an economy where
in￿ ation is set by an incumbent who is facing elections and is willing to distort
macroeconomic policy to win. In this model voters like growth, and dislike
28in￿ ation and unemployment; they heavily discount the past, and, instead, their
voting decision is in￿ uenced by the performance of the economy in the period
immediately before the election. In￿ ation expectations are adaptive and not
rational. In equilibrium the incumbent stimulates the economy before elections
in order to boost growth; the voters reward the incumbent for the short run
burst in economic activity, without realizing that this policy produces in the
post-election period a sub optimally high in￿ ation. The latter then needs a
post electoral recession to eliminate it, but the recession will be forgotten soon
by short sighted voters with short memories. In this model political business
cycles are produced by the short-sightedness of citizens in two ways. First they
have adaptive and non rational expectations about in￿ ation. Second, as voters,
they heavily discount the past. When a new election comes they have forgotten
the early recession and remember only the pre electoral boom.
Nordhaus￿model became immediately popular, and the 1972 election won
by Richard Nixon with what seemed to be a friendly help from the Fed and
some "checks in the mails" sent in the summer and fall of 1972, was often cited
as a perfect example of the Nordhaus￿model at work. In fact probably it was
that election which inspired the paper itself. At the same time however, the
"rational expectation revolution" was taking place in macroeconomics, and any
paper written without rational expectations was cast aside. As a result the
political business cycle models fell out fashion, at least in the mainstream of the
profession.
Persson and Tabellini (1990) show how political business cycles may arise
even when voters behave rationally. In their model politicians are identical
in everything but "competence". More competent governments are better at
managing economic policies and will achieve higher levels of output for given
in￿ ation and expected in￿ ation. Voters are rational and want to maximize their
expected utility; they will obviously want to elect the most competent politician
among the candidates. Again the timing of the elections is ￿xed and only two
candidates participate. The incumbent controls the in￿ ation and wants to win
the elections: he knows that in order to do so his expected competence must be
above the challenger￿ s expected level. There are two types of equilibria. In the
separating equilibrium it is too expensive for the incompetent type to distort
policies and therefore the competent type is able to achieve a level of growth
unattainable by an incompetent incumbent; voters will therefore be able to tell
the two types of politicians apart. There is also a pooling equilibrium in which
the incompetent type sets a high in￿ ation level to achieve the same output
level as the competent type who, on the other hand, does not deviate from the
optimal level of in￿ ation. In the more interesting separating equilibrium it is the
competent incumbent who chooses a higher than optimal in￿ ation rate in order
to achieve a high level of output, whereas the incompetent incumbent will choose
the one-period optimal in￿ ation rate because he cannot achieve the same level of
output. Voters do not know beforehand the competence of the incumbent, thus
expectations of in￿ ation in the period immediately before elections must be an
average of a higher and a lower in￿ ation: in￿ ation will be higher than expected if
the incumbent is competent and lower than expected otherwise; the competent
29policy-maker produces an economic expansion before elections and is reelected.
The political business cycle here is di⁄erent from the one in the Nordhaus model,
only one type of politician is able to create economic growth, the other type
determines a downturn; furthermore in this model there is no post-electoral
recession. In Appendix we sketch the derivation of these results. This model
has the advantage of not being based on irrationality or short slightness of
voters, However it is di¢ cult to test empirically since di⁄erence in the nature of
the electoral cycle are related to unobservable variable (by the econometricians)
like competence (and expected competence) of policymakers.
The model of competence was in fact introduced by Rogo⁄(1990) and Rogo⁄
and Sibert (1988) in the context of political budget cycles. These authors argue
that politicians may bias ￿scal expenditures towards easily observed interven-
tions and away from long-term investments in order to signal competence; the
political budget cycle is therefore driven by temporary information asymmetries
on competence over the conduct of ￿scal policy.
4.3 Political Cycles and Central Bank Independence
Central Bank independence also implies that monetary policy cannot be used (at
least directly) by policymakers to generate political business cycles, neither of
the opportunistic type nor of the partisan type. 37 Following Alesina and Gatti
(1995) we provide an illustration of the e⁄ect of Central Bank independence in
a partisan model where di⁄erent parties have di⁄erent policy goals.
Consider the partisan model we have seen before in section 4.1; we now
introduce output shocks and the possibility of delegation of monetary policy to
an independent Central Bank. The economy is now described by:
yt = ￿t ￿ ￿e
t + ￿t (31)
where an uncertainty term is added. As before the left-wing party (L) cares
relatively more about output than the right-wing party (R), bL > bR; P is again
the probability that the right-wing party wins the elections. For simplicity and
no loss of generality we assume that there are elections every period. Like before
expected in￿ ation is given by:
￿e =
bL(1 + bR) ￿ P(bL ￿ bR)
1 + bR + P(bL ￿ bR)
k (32)
Using expected in￿ ation we can determine in￿ ation and output that prevail
under the two parties in the period after elections:
￿L =
bL(1 + bR)
1 + bR + P(bL ￿ bR)
k ￿
bL
1 + bL￿t (33)
37However, as Drazen (2005) points out, the pressure on even independent Central Banks
can be di⁄erent in di⁄erent phases of the electoral cycles and be stronger right before elections.
30￿R =
bR(1 + bL)
1 + bR + P(bL ￿ bR)
k ￿
bR
1 + bR￿t (34)
yL =
P(bL ￿ bR)
1 + bR + P(bL ￿ bR)
k +
1
1 + bL￿t (35)
yR =
￿(1 ￿ P)(bL ￿ bR)
1 + bR + P(bL ￿ bR)
k +
1
1 + bR￿t (36)
The variances of in￿ ation and output are therefore equal to:
var(￿) =
(1 ￿ P)P(bL ￿ bR)2
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The expression for the variance of output has an intuitive explanation: the
￿rst term represents the variation of output determined by the electoral uncer-
tainty, it is increasing in the di⁄erence between the two parties￿preferences,
(bL ￿ bR) and disappears when P is either 0 or 1; the second term comes from
the economic uncertainty due to the shock ￿.
The politicians have the possibility of improving on this outcome by agreeing
before the election to appoint an independent central banker with preference ^ b
who cannot be removed from the o¢ ce. Alesina and Gatti (1995) show that
there is a range of values for ^ b such that the two parties are better o⁄delegating
the monetary policy to the independent central banker. The intuition is that ex
ante before the electoral uncertainty is resolved both parties have an incentive
to eliminate the uncertainty e⁄ect on output ￿ uctuations since their costs are
convex. An independent Central Bank provides two bene￿ts then: elimination
of the in￿ ation bias and elimination of policy uncertainty. The point here is that
by taking away monetary policy from the ebb and ￿ ows of the partisan cycles
the variance of in￿ ation and output may go down. So while in Rogo⁄￿ s model
the lower level of average in￿ ation is achieved at the cost of a higher level of out-
put variance in this model this is not necessarily the case. In fact by insulating
monetary policy from partisan cycles an independent Central Bank can achieve
at the same time lower in￿ ation and more output stabilization relative to the
case of non independent ones. This because the politically induced variance in
output is eliminated.
314.4 The Evidence
Alesina, Roubini ad Cohen (1997) use data on the United States for 1947-1994
and ￿nd evidence to support the partisan models. We refer the readers to that
book for a survey of the literature until 1997. These authors report systematic
di⁄erences in the rates of growth, the average in￿ ation rate and the unemploy-
ment rate between Democratic and Republican administrations with a pattern
consistent with the Rational Partisan Theory reviewed above. Instead they ￿nd
no evidence of opportunistic business cycles: monetary policy is not more ex-
pansionary during election years and there seems to be not much pre electoral
opportunistic manipulation of ￿scal policy, with some exceptions, notably 1972
in the US. Most of these results hold using data on eighteen OECD countries
for the period 1960-93: the evidence supports the rational partisan model espe-
cially in countries with a two-party system and rejects the opportunistic models.
They also test also the implication of the rational partisan theory that the size
of the political cycles should depend on the degree of electoral surprise; using
a proxy for the probability of electoral outcomes they ￿nd evidence in support
of the theory. In the period of the great moderation., partisan di⁄erences in
macroeconomic and in￿ ation policies have vastly diminished at least in OECD
countries. .
The most recent literature on political business cycles has focused not on
growth, unemployment and in￿ ation but upon ￿scal variables. Persson and
Tabellini (2005) empirically test a large theoretical body of literature on the
impact of di⁄erent political institutional settings on the economic development
of a country. They analyze a 60-country panel over almost 40 years in order
to uncover the in￿ uence of constitutions on the behavior of governments; they
￿nd that even if all countries are a⁄ected by political budget cycles, di⁄erent
constitutional features have an impact on which type of ￿scal policy is chosen.
Democracies with proportional representation tend to raise welfare spending
before elections, whereas majoritarian democracies cut spending. Presidential
regimes postpone unpopular ￿scal policy adjustments, but all types of govern-
ments seem to cut taxes during elections periods. Brender and Drazen (2005,
2007) show instead that political budget cycles exist only in "new democracies";
they argue that in countries with a longer democratic tradition voters punish
those politicians who opportunistically manipulate ￿scal policy to be reelected.
They show that it is not the nature of the electoral system as in Persson and
Tabellini but the "age" of democratic institutions which in￿ uence the existence
of political budget cycles.38 Gonzalez (2002) presents evidence on Mexican po-
litical business cycles; she shows that the government used public spending in
infrastructure and current transfers to win elections. Khemani (2004) ￿nds sim-
ilar results using data on Indian elections. Kneebone and Mckenzie (2001) use
Canadian province data and ￿nd opportunistic political business cycles both in
revenues and in spending. Block (2002) uses annual data on 44 Sub-Saharan
38 Drazen and Eslava (2006) design a model of political business cycles which is consistent
with this recent empirical evidence.
32African countries in the period 1980-1995 ￿nding clear patterns of electorally
timed interventions in key monetary and ￿scal policy variables, such as money
growth, interest rates, in￿ ation, seigniorage and nominal exchange rate changes,
￿scal de￿cits, expenditures and government consumption. Akhmedov and Zhu-
ravskaya (2004) use a monthly panel data set on Russia in the period 1995-2003
and ￿nd strong evidence of opportunistic budget cycles. They discover that the
budget cycle is short-lived and this may be a reason why previous literature
could ￿nd only weak evidence of cycles; public spending takes the form of direct
monetary transfers to voters; they also ￿nd a negative correlation between the
magnitude of the cycle and democracy, government transparency, media free-
dom and voter awareness. Finally they claim that pre-electoral manipulation
seems indeed to increase incumbents￿chances for reelection. Shi and Svensson
(2006) assemble a panel data of 85 countries for the period 1975-95 and they
￿nd that on average government de￿cit as a share of GDP increases by almost
one percentage point in election years; these budget cycles, though, seem to be
statistically signi￿cant only in developing countries. They also control for the
election variable being endogenous relative to ￿scal policy.
5 Currency Unions
In 1947 at the end of the second world war there were 76 countries in the world.
Today there are 193 (with a seat at the UN). Unless one believe that there is
a natural "law" according to which each country has to have its own currency,
either there were too few currencies in 1947 or there are too many today! 39
The question of whether we have too many or too few currencies today
is a relevant one. There has been much talk about dollarization especially in
South America, and some countries had made steps in that direction (Argentina,
Ecuador). Eleven countries in Europe formally adopted the same currency and
other countries then joined bringing the total of today at 16. A few countries
after decolonization have maintained the currency of the former colonizer (the
French Franc zone now linked to the Euro).
The decision about relinquishing their own currency has both economic and
political implications. One can think of two types of currency unions. One
in which a relatively small country unilaterally adopt the currency of a large
country, say Panama adopting the US dollar, or some former colonies keeping
the currency of an old colonizers like the French franc zone in Africa . A second
type of currency union is one in which a number of countries decide to give up
their own currency and create a new common one. The European Monetary
Union (EMU) is the primary current example.40
Mundell (1961) pointed out that the optimal currency area is the result of
39See Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Alesina Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000) for theoretical
and empirical discussion of the evolution of the number of countries in the world.
40In addition there have been several example of currency boards which lasted more or less,
like Hong Kong, Argentina and Lithuania with the dollar and Estonia and Bulgaria with the
German mark ￿rst and then with the Euro.
33two countervailing forces. On the one side we have the bene￿ts of a currency
union in facilitating trade in goods, services and ￿nancial transaction. Weighing
against those is the loss of independent monetary policy for each country which
gives up its own currency. Mundell stressed the role of wage ￿ exibility and labor
mobility as key variables a⁄ecting this trade o⁄. More ￿ exibility and mobility
make an independent monetary policy less advantageous thus weighing in favor
of monetary unions. In fact much of the debate in Europe before the adoption
of the common currency was precisely on the issue of whether Europe satis￿ed
the condition of wage ￿ exibility and labor mobility identi￿ed by Mundell.
Giavazzi and Pagano (1986) and Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) pointed
out the bene￿ts of ￿xed rates (and currency unions as a limiting case) as a
commitment device. Alesina and Barro (2002) have revisited the question for
optimal currency areas extending Mundell￿ s framework and incorporating it in
the discussion of rules versus discretion in monetary policy. While many of the
issues are common for the two types of currency unions (a unilateral adoption
or a creation of a new currency like the Euro) it is useful to analyze them
separately.
5.1 Unilateral adoptions
Using a simpli￿ed version of the Alesina and Barro (2002) model, consider
a world of two countries a large one indicated with the subscript L and one











The two shocks "L and "S
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(for simplicity) and a covariance equal to cov("L
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The other country instead, has not solved the problem of time inconsistency
of monetary policy and follows the discretionary one:
￿S





34Suppose now that country S adopts the currency of L, and in doing so, ac-
cepts the in￿ ation rule of the large country (￿L
t ). Two are the consequences.
First average in￿ ation goes to zero, eliminating the in￿ ation bias: country
L serves as a monetary "anchor". Second, monetary policy responds to the




Country S chooses the foreign currency i⁄ and only if:
k2(1 + b) > 2￿2 ￿ 2cov("S
t ;"L
t ) (43)
The factor that weighs against a currency union is a low covariance of the
shocks. If the covariance is low country S ￿nds itself often with the "wrong"
monetary policy: expansionary during boom and contractionary during reces-
sions. The factor which, on the contrary, weighs in favor of the currency unions
is a large value of k, which is a measure of the reduction of average in￿ ation for
country S, namely the value of having an "anchor" to low in￿ ation. Obviously
country S would never adopt the currency of a country not committed to a
credible low in￿ ation policy. Otherwise it would not gain in terms of average
in￿ ation and it would import a monetary policy targeted to the "wrong" shock.
In general, examples of unilateral adoption involve one or more small coun-
tries adopting the currency of a large one. In that case we could interpret our
superscript as L for large and S for small. In addition to these purely monetary
aspects of the monetary union there can be signi￿cant additional e⁄ects due to
trade. The small country could greatly bene￿t from bene￿cial e⁄ects on trade
￿ ows with the large country (more on this below). Note that the large country
is completely una⁄ected by the currency union neither in terms of in￿ ation, nor
realistically, in terms of trade ￿ ows given the relative size of the two countries.41
The case of one or more average sized countries adopting unilaterally a cur-
rency like the dollar or the euro may generate political complications. For
instance, imagine several countries in Latin America all adopting unilaterally
the US dollar, or several Central and Eastern European countries adopting the
Euro. In both cases the Fed and the ECB may come under political pressure if
Latin America and Central Europe at some point in time needed some monetary
policy di⁄erent from the one responding solely to the cycle of the US economy
or of the 11 original countries of the Euro Area.
5.2 Unilateral currency unions and "crisis"
Currency unions may come under stress during a crisis both for the small country
but also for the large anchor country. The most obvious example of a crisis is
an exceptionally "bad" realization of the shock of the small country (i.e. a very
low value of "S
t relative to the shock of the large countries). In this case the
41Even though we have referred to a large "anchor" country and a small "client" country,
economically speaking the size of the country is irrelevant, all that matters is the monetary
policy of the anchor country. In that respect Switzerland could be just as good an anchor
country as the US. However the trade bene￿t for the client country are increasing with the
size of the anchor country.
35small country would need a very expansionary monetary policy, which is not
provided by the anchor country. To make matter worse for the small country
the anchor may be pursuing a contractionary monetary policy in response to
an in￿ ationary shock. In this case, it may be too costly in the short run,
to maintain the currency union. The situation is similar analytically to the
case discussed above of a negative shock with an independent, in￿ ation averse
Central banker committed to low in￿ ation. In that case, we argued, one could
think of intermediate institutional arrangements in which a Central Bank loses
independence during a crisis. But in the case of a unilateral adoption of a foreign
currency this switch is impossible. Either a currency union is broken, or it is
not.
Note the analogy and the di⁄erence with a ￿xed exchange rate regime. The
choice of abandoning a ￿xed exchange rate to return to ￿ exible is much less
costly, institutionally, than abandoning a currency union. Therefore even a
relatively "small" crisis would lead to a breakdown of ￿xed rate systems. In
fact we have observed many examples of ￿xed rate systems reverting to ￿ exible
in response to crises of various nature. This is precisely the reason why certain
countries may prefer a currency union to ￿xed exchange rates, to make the
arrangement (and the anchor to a low in￿ ation country) more credible therefore
avoiding speculative attacks to the home currency.
But even a crisis in the large country could lead to a breakdown of the
currency union. As we have discussed above, a crisis in the anchor country (i.e.
an especially low realization of "L
t ) may lead to a breakdown of the monetary
policy rule. In this case the large country may not be any more a good "anchor"
for the small country which may decide to abandon the currency union. An
in￿ ation prone US, say , would not be a useful anchor for an in￿ ation prone
Latin American country.
5.3 Multilateral Currency Unions
Consider now two countries of roughly equal size (in the model exactly equal
size) forming a currency union with a new currency and a new Central Bank.
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36In Italy, instead, monetary policy follows "discretion":
￿I





How would a currency union between the two countries look like? The two
countries adopt a new currency and create a new Central Bank which follows
the optimal monetary policy for the entire currency union. In which case the
policy (￿CU








Germany would never join such a union purely based upon consideration
of monetary policy. It would have to adopt a monetary policy not targeted to
its own cycle and would not gain anything in terms of commitment or credibil-
ity. This was precisely the discussion which predated the adoption of the euro,
namely the question was "why would Germany join?". The answer has to rely
on considerations outside of purely monetary policy: one is the trade bene￿ts
for Germany, other considerations are more political in nature, and we return
to those below when we discuss in more detail the Euro.
For Italy the trade o⁄ is similar (in fact more advantageous) than the one
discussed above for the case of unilateral currency unions. In fact contrary to an
hypothetical unilateral adoption of the German mark by Italy, the new Central
Bank would target a shock which is an average of the Italian and German shock.
Italy loses an independent monetary policy but gains an anchor and in addition
a "new" stabilization policy not targeted only to the German shock like in the
case of unilateral adoptions. In fact, precisely because Italy would gain more
than Germany Italy would be willing to join a currency union even with a
monetary policy more tailored to the needs of Germany than to those of Italy
(namely reacting more to "G
t than "I
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< 0 for Italy (50)
In general there exist a value of ￿ > 1=2 such that Italy would be indi⁄erent
between joining the union or not.42
This very simple example captures some of the discussion underlying the
creation of the European Monetary Union.
42For certain parameter values, Italy might be willing to adopt a currency union in which
monetary policy is fully delegated to Germany, in which ￿ = 1. That is for Italy the condition
given above for a unilateral currency union (i.e. ￿ = 1) might be satis￿ed.
37First, the bene￿ts of the union are unevenly distributed. The countries in
need of a monetary anchor gain more. But there is an answer to why the
anchor country, say Germany, may want to join, namely the gain emerging from
a larger common market with smaller and fewer transaction cost in trade, more
competition etc.
Second, with multiple countries joining the currency union one needs certain
institutional rules to decide monetary policy, even certain voting rules. With
multiple countries we can think of voting rules which a⁄ect the choices of the
weight "￿i" with i indicating all the member countries. Alesina and Grilli (1992,
1993) discuss precisely this issue. In the ￿rst paper they analyze a model in
which the median country chooses the objective function of the central bank.43
By "median country" it is meant the country with the median "b" in their
objective function, using the notation of the model of the present paper. For the
same reason discussed above for the case of the conservative central banker, the
median voter (i.e. the median country) in the union would choose an objective
function for the supranational central bank more in￿ ation averse that the median
voter￿ s preference. Alesina and Grilli (1993) discuss how the structure of the
voting rules would in￿ uence the incentive to allow more countries to join in. New
countries would change the median voter and this move may be seen favorably
or unfavorably by those already in. This would a⁄ect the decision, by majority
rule of which new member to allow in.44 The political sensitivities of weight
in voting rules, is the reason why the ECB has from the very beginning tried
to present itself truly as a supranational institution rather than a committee of
national authorities. Had it chosen the other strategy there would have been
an explicit, politically costly and potentially damaging debate about the value
of the parameters "￿" which entered the ECB objective function.
Third, the covariance between shocks, namely cov("G
T ;"I
t) may be a⁄ected
by the formation of the union. In fact there are two countervailing e⁄ects. One
is that a currency union by increasing the policy coordination between members
and by increasing market integration, may increase the covariance between na-
tional shocks. This would reinforce the bene￿ts of the union. On the other hand
an increase in trade between members might lead to a specialization in di⁄erent
sectors of the economies of the country members. This would reduce the covari-
ance of the economic shocks of member countries. Empirically work by Frankel
and Rose (1998) suggests that trade integration increases the coordination of
business ￿ uctuations.
Fourth, the union would come under stress in times when the national shocks
are very divergent, in our example when "G
t is, say, large and positive and "I
t
negative and large in absolute value. This is a situation analogous to that of a
stress in a unilateral union discussed above. The di⁄erence is that the formation
43In the model there is an objective function common to all citizens of a country, each
country is therefore homogenous.
44Similar arguments apply to decisions about excluding member countries. There is not
a well de￿ned process for exclusions, but as the crisis of Greece, at the time of this writing
certain decisions like a bail out or not may be implicitly a decision about keeping a country
in or no.
38of a common (new) currency like, say the Euro, may imply even bigger costs in
breaking it up.
5.4 Trade bene￿ts of currency unions
The bene￿t of a currency union go beyond those of macroeconomic policy sta-
bility and in￿ ation and may involve as we mentioned above trade and ￿nancial
integration. Rose (2000) started a lively literature on the trade bene￿ts of cur-
rency unions. Using a United Nations panel dataset on trade among around
200 countries, Rose estimated a standard gravity model with the addition of a
currency union dummy and the coe¢ cient turned out to be strongly statistically
signi￿cant and astonishingly large; he found that currency unions triple trade
among their members. These results were received with skepticism, Persson
(2001) for instance raised the problem of endogeneity.: the decision of joining
a currency union clearly depends on the trade relations with the other mem-
bers and therefore is endogenous; OLS estimates of currency unions on bilateral
trade will be biased and this bias may account for the unusually large estimates.
He also showed that the group of countries sharing the same currency had sys-
tematically di⁄erent characteristics: countries in a currency union are smaller
and poorer, share a language or a border and they more often had the same
colonizer.
Since then many studies have tried to address the endogeneity. issue and
have con￿rmed statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects of currency unions on trade. Sev-
eral authors have produced estimates below those of Rose (2000) but it has been
"hard" at least in that framework involving many small countries adapting large
countries currencies to "bring down" the estimates to more reasonable values.
Frankel and Rose (2002) analyze a large cross-section of countries and ￿nd that
giving up the currency by joining a currency union or a currency board both
enhances trade and income. Glick and Rose (2002) provide some time-series
evidence using a panel data set covering 217 countries from 1948 through 1997;
they ￿nd using di⁄erent techniques that leaving a currency union decreases
trade. Rose and Stanley (2005) perform a meta-analysis of thirty-four papers
studying the e⁄ect of currency unions on trade and ￿nds that the hypothesis
of no e⁄ect is robustly rejected at standard signi￿cance levels. Barro and Ten-
reyro (2007) adopt a new instrumental variable approach. They argue that the
decision of creating a currency union between two countries is sometimes due
to the independent decision of these two countries to peg to a third country￿ s
currency; they estimate the probability that each country adopts the currency
of a main anchor country and then compute the joint likelihood that two coun-
tries independently peg to the same anchor: these likelihoods are then used as
instruments for being member of a currency union.
Alesina and Barro (2002) discuss the trade-o⁄s in the adoption of another
country￿ s currency and ￿nd that the countries that most gain in joining a cur-
rency union are those that trade most with each other, have the largest co-
movements in outputs and prices and have stable relative price levels. Alesina,
Barro and Tenreyro (2002) try to empirically determine "natural" currency ar-
39eas: using the criteria of Alesina and Barro (2002) they determine which coun-
tries in the world would gain by choosing as anchor either the euro or the dollar
or the yen. They ￿nd a dollar area involving Canada, Mexico, most of Central
America and parts of South America (except Argentina and Brazil) and a euro
area including all of western Europe and most of Africa; empirically there seems
to be no clear yen area though, being Japan a rather closed economy.
6 The Euro
The Euro is about 11 years old at the time of this writing (Spring 2010). Overall
the Euro has been a success even though it is now facing the most serious crisis
from its birth with the ￿scal problems of Greece Portugal, Spain and possibly
Italy.45 The euro had not been a miraculous "deus ex machina" that would
have prompted extraordinary growth for Europe as some of the most naive euro
enthusiasts would have dreamed. But it has been more successful than the
skeptics would have predicted. However the aftermath of the ￿nancial crisis is
proving to be quite challenging for the Euro zone.
6.1 The pre crisis period of the Euro
It is useful to begin by reviewing what one would have said about the Euro
before the ￿nancial crisis started in the summer of 2008 and how the euro per-
formed during the crisis. At the end of the nineties many (especially American)
economists were rather skeptical about the creation of a common currency area
in Europe. Obstfeld (1997) o⁄ered a careful analysis of pros and cons ending
with a relatively negative tone.46 In favor of the union were the anchor e⁄ect for
high in￿ ation countries, a reduction of trade costs and barriers, a deepening of
the common market ￿nancial integration, and for those who supported it, a step
towards more political unity in Europe. The critics pointed out the problem of
abandoning a policy instruments in a region full of rigidities in labor markets,
a feature which does not satisfy any of Mundell￿ s conditions of an optimal cur-
rency area. The lack of wage ￿ exibility and the low mobility of labor within
the union might have made the loss of an independent national monetary policy
problematic.
On the latter point the optimists replied, perhaps with a bit of a leap of
faith, that the monetary union would have given an impulse to adopt those
liberalizing reforms. Alesina, Ardagna and Galasso (2010) investigate precisely
this question, namely whether or not the adoption of the euro has indeed fa-
cilitated the introduction of structural reforms, de￿ned as deregulation in the
product markets and liberalization in the labor markets. They ￿nd that the
adoption of the euro has been associated with an acceleration of the pace of
45See Issing (2008) for an in depth discussion of the process that led to the creation and
consolidation of the Euro and the European Central Bank
46See also the exhaustive set of references provided in that paper which summarizes the pre
euro discussion regarding the monetary union.
40structural reforms in the product market. As for the labor market the evidence
is harder to interpret. Reforms in the primary labor market have proceeded
very slowly everywhere and the euro does not seem to have generated much of
an impetus here.47 On the other hand in several countries like France, Italy and
Spain new form of labor contracts have been introduced based upon temporary
agreements between employers and workers. The authors also explore whether
the euro has brought about wage moderation: they ￿nd evidence of it in the run
up (1993-1998) of euro membership but not afterwards. 48 Thus at least in part
the optimists might have been right on this point but not fully. The impetus
for ￿scal reforms and moderation for instance stopped after the adoption of the
euro, after a period of restraint.
The most radical critics of the Euro, in particular Feldstein (1997) objected
that the divergent needs of monetary policy in the euro area would have created
more tensions amongst members who would have reduced rather than increased
economic cooperation in Europe increasing political tensions. This was rather
extreme but even one of us (Alesina 1997) was also worried about con￿ icts
regarding the conduct of monetary and ￿scal policy. Eichengreen (2010) after
reviewing these arguments concludes (correctly in our view) that reality turned
out to be more in line with the predictions of the optimists rather with those of
the worst pessimists. To be sure there were indeed con￿ icts and dissatisfaction
in the ￿rst years of the Euro. Countries with low growth, like Italy, blamed the
euro for being locked in a system which did not allow devaluations.49 A second
source of tension related to the policy of the ECB. Several European leaders,
especially from Italy, France and Spain attacked the ECB for its policies which
were, allegedly, too concerned about in￿ ation rather than growth, for having a
too low b in the language of our model. The rhetoric in the ￿rst part of century
was that the ECB was chocking the growth in Europe, while the Fed under
the miraculous hands of Alan Greenspan was promoting growth in the US. The
critiques to the ECB were largely wrong and, in fact the ECB served the purpose
of the scapegoat, for timid politicians incapable to deliver structural reforms.
It goes beyond the scope of the present paper a detailed analysis of the policies
of the ECB but the view that this institution is responsible for the low average
growth of several large countries in continental Europe in the decade before the
2008 crisis is incorrect.50 The ECB was also in the spot light for the wide
￿ uctuations of the value of the Euro against the Dollar: the Euro went from a
47See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) for a discussion of the sequencing of labor and product
market reforms in Europe.
48Bugamelli, Schivardi and Zizza (2009) further pursue this question from a di⁄erent angle
and ￿nd that productivity growth has been relatively stronger in those countries and sectors
that before the euro was adopted relied more on competitive devaluations to regain price
competitiveness.
49The current (2009) economic minister of Italy Giulio Tremonti repeatedly expressed very
negative views about the role of the Euro in explaining the Italy decline and one member of
the Italian parliament who then later became Interior Minister called for an exit for Italy from
the Euro. Fortunately the markets paid no attention.
50See several chapters in the book edited by Alesina and Giavazzi (2010) on the ￿rst ten
years of the Euro for more discussions.
41minimum of 0.85 cents on the dollar in 2000 to close to 1.6 a few years later.
Pundits (often the same ones) were ready to criticize the ECB before for a low
and than for a high Euro.
Another source of tension which was looming in the ￿rst ten years of the
Euro and exploded with the global ￿nancial crisis was the sluggish productivity
growth in several Mediterranean countries, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy.
The rigidity of real wages and the lack of labor mobility made adjustments
extremely di¢ cult and contributed to the ￿scal crises which exploded in 2010
starting in Greece. Spain su⁄ered enormously from an overextended real estate
sector which tumbled, Greece appeared as a very backward, government sup-
ported and unproductive economy, Italy grew at a much lower pace than the
rest of Europe for the decade. In short convergence amongst Euro area countries
was far from ideal.
Finally it would appear that the common currency did increase trade amongst
members, namely it made the European common market more e⁄ective. Frankel
(2009) ￿nds a 15/20% increase in trade over just seven years (1999-2006): this
is small compared to the large e⁄ects found by Rose studying other currency
unions, (see our discussion above) but the e⁄ect is by no means negligible es-
pecially considering that Euro area countries were already heavily integrated
before the adoption of the common currency. Gropp and Kashyap (2010) and
Giovannini (2010) discuss the successes and failures of ￿nancial integration in
the Euro area.
6.2 The Euro in times of crisis
The ￿nancial crisis of 2008/9 initially made the Euro more popular amongst
European politicians and leaders. The impression was that high debt, countries
like Italy, Greece or Portugal or countries especially hit by the real estate crisis
like Spain and Ireland would have su⁄ered Argentinian style currency crises,
speculative attacks etc. Many of those who had argued against the Euro in
Italy for instance, after the outset of the crisis were singing its praise! Not only,
but European countries which had chosen not to join the Euro were prompted
to reconsider their decisions. For instance Sodestrom (2009) argues that an
independent monetary policy and exchange rate ￿ uctuations hurt the Swedish
economy at the outset of the crisis. In fact until the crisis since the start of EMU
the exchange between the krona and the euro has remained remarkably stable￿
so stable that one could have argued whether the Riksbank was really targeting
domestic in￿ ation, but since the crisis erupted the krona in a few months has
depreciated by almost 10% against the euro. This has confronted Sweden with
a di¢ cult policy choice: raise interest rates to stabilize the krona-euro exchange
rate or lower rates to avoid ￿nancial trouble and also a possible recession.
It is interesting that Denmark, Sweden and the UK reacted to the crisis
moving in opposite directions. Sweden and the UK have given up on exchange
rate stability and have lowered rates; the Danish central bank has intervened
heavily in the foreign exchange market and has been forced to raise interest rates
from 5 per cent to 5.5 per cent ￿a full 1.75 points higher than the ECB￿ s rate,
42in order to stabilize the exchange rate. As a result, a renewed debate about the
bene￿ts of euro membership has opened up in Denmark: some argue that the
country should run a new referendum on the euro. Even Iceland now speaks
about the bene￿ts of the euro, even if this country is not even a member of the
European Union.51
Similar problems have manifested themselves in Central and Eastern Europe.
In Hungary almost all mortgages are denominated in Swiss francs or euros: a
currency depreciation would trigger a series of personal and banking failures.
Thus the country is struggling between the desire to stabilize the exchange
rate and the need to provide liquidity to the economy. In the Spring of 2009
the IMF suggested that several central and Eastern European countries should
have considered joining the Euro area even without a seat in the ECB board.
The Euro sceptics before the adoption of the Euro argued that it would
not have survived the ￿rst major crisis. Instead the popularity of the Euro
seemed to have come stronger with crisis. Why? The type of tension that
Euro sceptics had in mind were disagreements over the conduct of monetary
policy and asymmetric business cycle shock. This indeed in part augured in
the ￿rst 7-8 years of the cycle. Business cycle ￿ uctuations continued to be not
perfectly correlated as discussed above. However when the crisis of 2008 hit, it
a⁄ected everyone. Injection of liquidity by the ECB were welcomed by all and
all countries felt somehow "protected" by the umbrella of the Euro.
However the crisis also brought to light a problem which was looming in the
background and too few observers had digested its danger. Several countries
like Greece, Portugal and Spain in particular had continued to borrow abroad
at rates which were not much higher than those charged to German borrowers.
Credit came very cheaply, too cheaply, to those countries, which also has struc-
tural problems, as discussed above. When the crisis hit and de￿cits zoomed
up to 10 per cent of GDP or more, bond markets woke up to the danger and
the fact that not all countries in Europe had the same credential of Germany
as borrowers. At the time of this writing a major program to solve the ￿scal
problems is being pout in place by the Euro area countries and the IMF. The
future of Greece as a Euro member in the medium run is quite doubtful. Some
pessimists argue that even the future of the Euro is in jeopardy. The most
likely scenario is that the ￿scal rescue package will allow some breathing room
for highly indebted and more fragile countries to "put their house in order".
Fiscal adjustments will be the task of the next few years. The future of the
Euro area and especially of the Mediterranean countries depend on this.
6.3 Political and monetary union
In addition to its economic costs and bene￿ts, the monetary union in Europe has
been seen by many, as an important step towards political uni￿cation. Therefore
the bene￿ts of the Euro have to include its help towards political integration.
51Willem Buiter and Anne Sibert (2008) argue that Iceland is only an extreme case of a
more general phenomenon ￿ of a small country with its own currency, and banking sectors
too large to be bailed out by national authorities.
43This argument has two parts. One is that political uni￿cation is desirable and,
second that the Euro will help to achieve this goal. This is not the place to dis-
cuss in detail the ￿rst point, but political uni￿cation in Europe seems to have
stalled.52 On the second point, i.e. the euro as a political tool to unify Europe
one has to raise a bit of healthy skepticism. To begin with only a subset of
European Union countries have adopted the Euro. Thus if the Euro is a sym-
bol, and a necessity, for political union it would imply a very strange "United
States of Europe" which would not include the UK, Sweden and Denmark for
instance, countries which are an integral part of the economic union. More
generally Europe is evolving into a collection of countries some of which share
some policies (say monetary policies) and other groups other ones (say open
borders for travelers, the Schengen Treaty). Second the recent enlargement to
27 countries members of the union have made it less likely that the degree of
political integration will intensify due to the large di⁄erences of member coun-
tries. Third, recent attempts of deepening political ties, like the adoption of a
European Constitution have received limited support from European citizens.
Finally every time a crisis hits Europe its institutions seem to take a secondary
role. For instance for all the talk about ￿scal coordination at the onset of the
recent crisis every country went on its own. Not only, but there were hints of
"beggar thy neighbor policies".53 Rather than ￿scal policy coordination, in 2008
and 2009 the feeling amongst member countries was to make sure that nobody
bene￿tted by other countries expansionary ￿scal policies and the associated do-
mestic debts. In the case of foreign policy disagreements and inability to act as
a unit have been even more obvious. To be sure the European Union has made
important progress in establishing a common market, eliminating some, but not
all, ine¢ cient government regulations and promoting some reforms especially in
goods markets.54 This is all good, but it is well short of political union and in
fact one may wonder whether political union would necessarily make reforms
more or less likely to be adopted. Some commentators argue of instance that
some of the reform policies promoted by the European Commission, regarding
for instance, avoidance of government subsidies, elimination of indirect trade
barriers etc. have occurred precisely because this body is relatively non polit-
ical and unresponsive to the European Parliament.55 The European Union is
becoming more and more a collection of countries with economic integration
and sharing of certain policies amongst sub groups of the entire set of members.
The idea of a politically united Europe with the Euro as its currency and the
ECB as its Central bank is fading (see also Issing (2008)). The recent harsh
divisions regarding the rescue plans for indebted countries have highlighted dif-
ferent views between Euro memebrs. The Euro will have to exist without a
52See Alesina and Perotti (2004) for a critical view of the process of European Uni￿cation.
Issing (2010) also notes how the Euro will have to live without a political union behind it.
53Ireland for instance, at the onset of the crisis, introduced emergency banking policies
which negatively a⁄ected British Banks.
54See Alesina Ardagna and Galasso (2010) for a recent discussion of the e⁄ect of the euro
adoption on labor and good market reforms.
55On these issue see Alesina and Perotti (2004) and several essays in Alesina and Giavazzi
(2010).
44political entity behind its back.
7 Conclusion
The ￿nancial crisis of 2008/09 has shaken some of the foundations of what
we thought we knew about monetary policy and its institutions. We thought
that independent Central Banks targeting in￿ ation were the solution, which
would have eliminated instability, political interference on monetary policy and
guaranteed an orderly management of the macroeconomic cycle. This chapter
has reviewed the literature that has lead us to those conclusions and has begun
to address what novel issues the crisis has brought under the limelight. In
this respect the chapter has raised more questions than provided answers. It
is fair to say that at the time of this writing we haven￿ t quite digested yet the
implications of the crisis for the conduct of monetary policy and its institutions.
Probably the next Handbook of Monetary economics in a decade or so will have
all the solutions. Now that we have clari￿ed some of the questions we need to
start looking for the answers.
8 Appendix
8.1 Independent Central Banker
The independent central banker is chosen by minimizing the loss function with
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Minimizing the loss with respect to ^ b we obtain the following ￿rst order condi-
tion:
F(^ b) = ^ bk2 +
^ b ￿ b
(1 +^ b)3￿2
￿ = 0 (53)
It can be easily checked that F() is an increasing function for the range of
coe¢ cients we are interested in, which means that the second order condition is
satis￿ed. If we call ^ b￿ the value that satis￿es the ￿rst order condition, F(^ b￿)=0,
since F() evaluated in b gives bk2 > 0 and F() is an increasing function, then
we can deduce that ^ b￿ < b, which means that the central banker chosen is going
to be more "conservative" than the general public.
458.2 Central Bank (in)dependence in times of crisis
The economy is described by:
yt = ￿t ￿ ￿e
t + "t (54)
The government appoints a conservative central banker and commits to let him
choose the monetary policy by setting a cost c that she has to pay to override
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where ￿ is a dummy variable equal to 1 only when the government ￿res the
central banker and takes over monetary policy. In this model action takes place
in three stages: in the ￿rst the government chooses ^ b, the degree of conserva-
tiveness of the central banker, and the cost c of reneging on her commitment.
In the second stage expectations are rationally formed; in the third stage the
output shock is realized, the central banker sets in￿ ation, the government de-
cides whether to take over monetary policy and ￿nally in￿ ation and output are
realized. The model is solved by backward induction and it can be shown that
the optimal contract features a conservative central banker, ^ b < b, and a strictly
positive but ￿nite cost of reneging on commitment, 0 < c < 1. In equilibrium
the central banker will choose his favorite policy if the output shock is below
a certain threshold and therefore in normal conditions in￿ ation will be lower;
in extreme conditions, i.e. when the shock exceeds the threshold, the central
banker will choose the policy preferred by the median voter so that he is never
￿red in equilibrium.
8.3 Opportunistic Business Cycles
Political cycles in￿ uence economic outcomes even when politicians are identical
in ideology but di⁄er in competence; voters would like to elect the most compe-
tent policy-maker and therefore politicians are willing to distort optimal policies
in order to signal their abilities. Let us continue assuming that the economy is
described by a simple Phillips curve, but we add a competence term:
yt = ￿t ￿ ￿e
t + ￿t (56)
where competence has the following time structure:
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿t (57)
Competence can assume only two values:
￿t = ￿ ￿; with probability ￿
= ￿; with probability 1 ￿ ￿
46such as:
E(￿t) = ￿￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ = 0










0 < ￿ < 1 (58)
We also assume rational expectations and that the policy-maker directly controls
in￿ ation. Let￿ s focus on a two period model where elections are held only at
the end of the ￿rst period. The model is solved by backward induction. Since
there are no elections, in period two the policy-maker has no incentive to signal
his competence; he will maximize the period utility so that in￿ ation and output
will be: ￿2 = ￿e
2 = b and y2 = ￿2. The incumbent expected net gain from
winning the election is the di⁄erence between his utility if he wins, Ui, and his
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We also assume that even an incompetent politician has the incentive to be in
o¢ ce rather than not: H > ￿b￿. Since in the ￿rst period voters do not observe
in￿ ation, they are not able to understand whether the incumbent is competent
or not; both types of politician have therefore an incentive to appear competent
by boosting economic growth. The incumbent sets in￿ ation above expectations:
￿t(￿i
t) = ￿e
t + yt ￿ ￿i
t ￿ ￿ y (62)
Obviously choosing in￿ ation in order to surprise the public has a cost, which
can be written as the di⁄erence between utility evaluated at the time consistent
















There are two types of equilibria: separating and pooling.
478.3.1 Separating Equilibrium
The two types of politician achieve two di⁄erent levels of output so that voters
are perfectly able to tell them apart. Voters attribute probability ￿t+1 = 1 to
the incumbent￿ s being competent if and only if output is higher than a certain
level: yt ￿ ys
t. The competent politician can achieve this threshold ys
t, but the
incompetent one cannot; for this reason the latter will choose ￿t = b, but the
former will choose a higher level of in￿ ation in order to boost the economy. The
expected in￿ ation will therefore be:
￿e
t = (1 ￿ ￿)b + ￿￿t(￿ ￿) = b + ￿
ys ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ y
1 ￿ ￿
(64)
Another way to say that only the competent politician can achieve the high
level of output is that the discounted net gain from reelection is higher than the
cost of signaling; the opposite must be true for the incompetent politician:
￿W(￿ ￿) > C(ys; ￿ ￿) (65)
￿W(￿) ￿ C(ys;￿) (66)
The competent politician will obviously choose to achieve minimum level of
output that the incompetent incumbent would not be willing to target, ys will
be equal to the value that satis￿es (8.3.1) with equality.
8.3.2 Pooling Equilibrium
In the pooling equilibrium both types of incumbent achieve the same level of
output; voters attribute the prior probability ￿t+1 = ￿ to the incumbent￿ s being
competent if output is higher than a certain threshold yp. The competent
incumbent chooses in￿ ation without signaling, which implies:
yp = b ￿ ￿e
t + ￿ ￿ + ￿ y (67)
The incompetent incumbent will have to set in￿ ation above expectations in
order to achieve yp:
￿t(￿;yp) = yp + ￿e
t ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ y (68)
Expected in￿ ation will be:
￿e
t = ￿b + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t(￿;yp) = b +
1 ￿ ￿
￿
(yp ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ y) (69)
48Plugging (69) in (67) we ￿nd that yp = ￿ y. Since voters cannot tell apart the two
types of politicians, the probability that the incumbent will be reelected will be
1
2; the incompetent incumbent must ￿nd convenient to achieve the high level of
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